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FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF
CABLE TELEVISION: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE NEW FCC RULES*
Cable television, or CATV,1 was initially designed to provide
television reception in isolated communities beyond the range of con-
ventional television signals. By 1971, however, it served nine percent
of the nation's television viewers and is presently growing in geometric
proportions.2 From a system that carried but a few broadcast signals,
the cable can now transmit on 42 channels or more and is capable of
* The federal CATV regulations considered in this comment were released by the FCC on
Feb. 3, 1972. Cable Television Report & Order,__ F.C.C.2d - (Docket No. 18397, etc.,
FCC No. 72-108) (1972). The originally projected date for the promulgation of these rules was
during 1971; the major reason for the delay has been a conflict between the broadcast industry
and cable interests over the regulations governing distant signal importation by cable television
systems and the protection from duplication to be given the programming broadcast by a tele-
vision station located in a community served by CATV. See BROADCASTING, Oct. 25, 1971, at
28; Nov. 15, 1971, at 16; Dec. 13, 1971, at 42; Jan. 10, 1972, at 45, for an account of this dis-
pute. The CATV Order added Cable Television Service, Part 76, to title 47 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, and changed the section number of most regulations affecting CATV.
All current regulations will be cited to the revised C.F.R. designations.
1. "The term 'community antenna television system' ('CATV system') means any facility
which, in whole or in part, receives directly or indirectly over the air and amplifies or otherwise
modifies the signals transmitting programs broadcast by one or more television stations and
distributes such signals by wire or cable to subscribing members of the public who pay for such
service. . . ." 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(2) (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972).
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, FINAL REPORT (released 1969)
[hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE];
TASK FORCE ON CATV and TELECOMMUNICATIONS, A REPORT OF CABLE TELEVISION AND
CABLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY (1968) [hereinafter cited as MAYOR'S
REPORT];
N. FELDMAN, CABLE TELEVISION: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS IN LOCAL PROGRAM
ORIGINATION (Rand Corp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as PROBLEMS IN LOCAL PROGRAM
ORIGINATION];
L. JOHNSON, THE FUTURE OF CABLE TELEVISION: SOME PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL
REGULATION (Rand Corp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as FUTURE OF CABLE TELEVISION];
R. PARK, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CABLE GROWTH ON TELEVISION BROADCASTING (Rand
Corp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as IMPACT OF CABLE GROWTH];
R. POSNER, CABLE TELEVISION: THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL MONOPOLY (Rand Corp. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL MONOPOLY];
Note, Who's Afraid of CA TV?., 16 N.Y.L.F. 187 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Who's Afraid
of CA TV?];
Letter from FCC Chairman Dean Burch to Senate Communications Subcommittee, Aug.
5, 1971 [hereinafter cited as FCC Chairman's Letter].
2. Note, Common Carrier CA TV." Problems and Proposals, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 533
(1971).
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providing two-way communication.' Moreover, experiments are
being conducted to ascertain the feasibility of replacing the coaxial
cable between the central antenna and the individual subscriber with
less expensive microwave signals beamed through the open air or
through underground conduits.4 Federal, state and local governments
are presented with the problem of channeling this new and rapidly
evolving technology in a manner most advantageous to the public
interest. CATV's value to the public is clear; it promises to "provide
an abundance of channels at a relatively low cost per channel; it is
potentially adaptable to selective distribution to particular audiences,
even if they are scattered throughout a city or area; it provides an
effective vehicle for raising money through subscription fees to sup-
port television from the viewers themselves, thereby increasing the
resources available for the support of additional programming; and
it is already a thriving business able to prosper without governmental
subsidy or protection." 5 The challenge presented by cable television
is how to avoid the detrimental effects of nonregulation while, at the
same time, encouraging the full development of CATV.8
3. A 42 channel system is partially ready for operation in San Jose, Calif. BROADCASTING,
Feb. 2, 1970, at 36. As to the number of channels to be required in the future see notes 170-77
infra and accompanying text.
Cable systems with two-way capability are presently being constructed in Akron, Ohio and
in San Jose, Calif. BROADCASTING, supra. The FCC, having concluded that two-way communi-
cation is now technically and economically feasible, requires all new systems to have two-way
capability. 47 C.F.R. § 76.25 1(a)(3) (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972). See note 177 infra and
accompanying text. Services that may be provided include: facsimile reproduction of news-
papers and other written documents; electronic mail delivery; business links to branch offices;
special communications systems to reach particular neighborhoods or ethnic groups within a
community; educational and training programs; and governmental surveillance for crime
detection, fire detection and air pollution control. Notice of Proposed Rule Making and
Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, at 8 (1968). For a discussion of the communications
services that may be possible through cable television, see Industrial Electronics Division/The
Electronics Association (EIA) Response to the CATV Inquiry, The Future of Broadband
Communications (submitted to the FCC Oct. 28, 1969) excerpted in BROADCASTING, Nov. 3,
1969, at 3. See also MAYOR'S REPORT 11-13; Note, Regulation of Community Antenna
Television, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 840-42 (1970).
4. Alternatives to coaxial cable, such as microwave, as the means of transmitting signals
to individual subscribers are being considered. TIME, Apr. 12, 1971, at 59. For a discussion of
the advantage of microwave over coaxial cable as a means of local distribution, see note 21 infra.
For a history of the development of cable television see M. SEIDEN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION SYSTEMS AND THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY
(1965); Note, The Wire Mire: The F.C.C. and CA TV, 79 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1965).
5. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ch. 7, at 10,
6. Id. at 10-11. The social cost of non-regulation would consist of the adverse impact on
the broadcasting industry, see notes 129-45 infra and accompanying text, and the economic
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National communications policy as originally stated in the Fed-
eral Communications Act of 19341 was to encourage the larger use
of the radio in the public interest.8 The President's Task Force on
Communications Policy has subsequently identified six major objec-
tives to be sought in future regulation of the broadcast industry: the,
industry should be capable of catering to a wide variety of tastes;
television should perform an array of social functions; an effective
means of local expression and local advertising should be provided;
the cost of access to the broadcast medium should be as low as
possible; television should be made available to as many people as
possible, "rural as well as urban, poor as well as affluent"; and
finally, concentration of control over communications media should
be avoided. 9
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), created by the
Communications Act, 10 is charged with the responsibility of defining
the above goals in terms of specific regulations. With respect to cable
television, the Commission in 1968 moved from a position of ex-
tremely limited regulation to the point of asserting full plenary juris-
diction over CATV. As the result of four separate rule-making pro-
ceedings, the Commission has promulgated regulations governing the
origination of programming by CATV,11 and has now issued regula-
tions governing the number of television broadcast signals which may
be carried by CATV, 12 minimum channel capacity and other technical
standards for cable systems,13 and the relationship between federal
costs resulting from an unregulated monopoly, see notes 216-24 infra and accompanying text.
While there is disagreement over who should regulate CATV, there is general agreement that
regulation is necessary. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ch. 7; MAYOR'S REPORT; Baker,
The CA TV Problem from the Telephone Carrier's View, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 25, 1969, at
72; Barnett & Greenberg, A Proposal for Wired City Television, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Schild-
hause, CA TV-From the Regulatory Point of View, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 25, 1969, at 78;
Symposia, Antitrust and Monopoly Policy in the Communications Industries, 13 ANTITRUST
BULL. 867 (1968); Witt, CATV and Local Regulation, 5 CAL. W.L. REV. 30 (1968); Note,
CATV-The FCC's Dilemma, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 343 (1969); Note, Federal, State, and
Local Regulation of CA TV-After You Alphonse. . . . 29 U. PTr. L. REV. 109 (1967). But
cf. Matthews, CA TVfrom the Industry Viewpoint, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 25, 1969, at 66,
68-69; Shafer, Cable Television: Is State Regulation Needed?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 3, 1969,
at 23; Note, The FCCs Proposed CA TV Regulations, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1685, 1710-13 (1969).
7. 47 U.S.C. § 151 etseq. (1970).
8. Id. at § 151.
9. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ch. 7, at 3-4.
10. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
11. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972).
12. 47 C.F.R. § 76.51-.65 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. -(1972).
13. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.251, 76.601-.617 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972).
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and state-local regulation of cable television. 4 The resulting regula-
tions will have a significant impact upon the future of cable television
and should be analyzed as to their consistency with the national goals
for broadcasting.
This comment will briefly treat the development of FCC regula-
tion of CATV and will consider in detail the regulations recently pro-
mulgated by the FCC. In the latter regard, the initial question is
whether the FCC has the authority under the Communications Act to
issue the regulations. It is also necessary to consider the substantive
validity of the regulations on both legal and policy grounds. Finally,
the regulatory framework of state and local governments must be
surveyed in order to determine the governmental impact on cable
television to date, and the effect which the FCC's regulations will
have on existing state and local regulation. By way of conclusion,
consideration will be given the questions of whether the traditional
rationale for governmental regulation of the communications indus-
try is an appropriate justification for the present CATV regulations
and whether this same form of regulation is adequate to meet new
problems presented by cable television.
THE ORIGINAL VIEW: CATV AS A SUPPLEMENTAL MEANS OF COMMU-
NICATION
Since 1960, when microwave carriers serving CATV were first
regulated,' 5 the FCC has asserted that limited jurisdiction over cable
television was necessary to achieve the purpose of the Communica-
tions Act.'" In 1965, the microwave regulations were extended to cover
CATV systems being served by microwave carriers.17 After conclud-
ing that regulation of CATV was necessary to prevent irreparable
damage to existing broadcasters, especially UHF stations, 8 the FCC
14. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. -(1972).
15. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), affd 321 F.2d 359
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (sustaining FCC regulation of microwave carriers). A microwave carrier
transmits television signals received in one location to a cable system located in a distant
community. Id. at 361. Microwave carrier service is primarily utilized when the distant televi-
sion signal cannot be received by an antenna constructed by the cable operator. This service
should be distinguished from the possible use by CATV operators of microwave in lieu of a
cable to transmit programming locally to subscribers. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
16. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
17. See Rules Re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
18. Second Order & Report, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, at 123 (1966). See notes 136, 144 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of the potential impact of CATV on broadcasting. See notes
26, 120 infra for a discussion of the FCC's efforts to protect UHF television. But see text
accompanying notes 136-39 infra.
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in 1966 asserted jurisdiction over limited aspects of all cable television
systems. 9 The resulting regulations, prescribing the programming
that could be transmitted, were premised on the Commission's con-
clusion that cable television should be a supplement to broadcast
television rather than an independent means of communication. 2 Be-
cause CATV relies on cable as a means of distribution, it is presently
available only in areas with a concentrated population and even then
is available only to those willing to pay the subscription fee. 21 By
treating CATV as a supplement to, rather than as a subsitute for,
broadcast television, the Commission sought to promote broadcast
television, which would be available to a greater percentage of the
population.22
The Commission premised its authority to promulgate rules
covering limited aspects of cable television on two theories of ancil-
lary jurisdiction: one based on its jurisdiction over broadcasters; the
other, on its jurisdiction over common carriers.
Jurisdiction Ancillary to Broadcast Regulation
The major service furnished by CATV has been providing a sys-
tem whereby subscribers obtain better television reception than that
possible with individual antennas and providing additional signals
which otherwise cannot be received. By strategically locating large
antennas or by utilizing a microwave carrier,2 cable television can
import distant signals into an area.24 When the city in which the
system is located has local stations providing network programming
and the quality of the local broadcast picture is good, non-network
programming which is originated in a distant city and imported is the
major selling factor of cable television.
19. 2 F.C.C.2d 725, at 46.
20. Id. at 47. For a description of these regulations, see notes 27-29 infra and accompa-
nying text.
21. Id. at 155. One of the defects of cable television and a major reason given for
protecting conventional broadcasting is the cost of the distribution system which limits the
service to residents of areas of high population concentration willing and able to pay the
subscription fee. Providing an inexpensive substitute for coaxial cable, such as microwave,
would encourage the rapid development of CATV, making it available to many more people.
22. Id. at i 155.
23. See note 15 supra.
24. Initially cable television developed as a means of providing television programming to
areas that could not otherwise receive broadcast signals. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
It was the development of cable television in areas that could receive broadcast signals that
prompted FCC action. First Order & Report, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
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The FCC concluded that by importing programming without
copyright payment, which both duplicated programming provided by
local stations and provided additional program'ming as well, CATV
posed a threat to local broadcasting.?' The importation of additional
programming was also thought to inhibit the development of new
local broadcast stations.2 6 To protect existing broadcasters and avoid
discouraging future applicants, the Commission issued its 1966 regu-
lations requiring that local programming be carried on the cable
system if so requested,2 that such programming not be duplicated on
other channels within 24 hours of its local broadcast, 2 and that the
number of imported distant signals be limited.2 1
The Commission's authority to issue the regulations was upheld
in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. 3 The Court, while not
considering the limits of FCC jurisdiction,3' held that under the gen-
eral provisions of the Communicatiois Act, 32 the Commission could
issue regulations "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance
of [its] various responsibilities for the regulation of television broad-
casting." Regulatory authority over CATV was premised on the
need to protect the forms of communication under the direct jurisdic-
tion of the FCC. The Court reasoned that unregulated importation
of signals could destroy local broadcasters, which would be to the
25. Second Order and Report, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, at 122 (1966).
26. Id. at 127. The FCC has for many years been concerned with encouraging the
development of new television stations, Sixth Order and Report, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952),
particularly UHF broadcasters, in order to improve the diversity of programming available.
The All Channel Receiver Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(s), 330 (1970), was enacted to
increase UHF penetration. See generally Webbink, The Impact of UHF Promotion: The All-
Channel Television Law, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 535 (1969). For further discussion of the
FCC's efforts to protect UHF stations, see note 120 infra. But see notes 136-47 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of CATV's actual impact on UHF television.
27. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1103(a) (1970).
28. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1103(f) (1970).
29. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1107 (1970). For a discussion of these rules see Note, The FCC's
Proposed CA TV Regulations, supra note 6.
30. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
31. See notes 80-106 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the parameters of the
FCC's statutory authority.
32. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970), which provides that the Communications Act
shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio and all interstate
and foreign transmission of energy by radio, which originates and/or is received within
the United States, and to all persons engaged within the United States in such communi-
cation or such transmission of energy by radio .
33. 392 U.S. at 178.
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detriment of the public interest, given the limited number of people
who would be able, in turn, to subscribe to cable television.34
Jurisdiction Ancillary to Common Carrier Regulation
The FCC's jurisdiction in Southwestern Cable was upheld as an-
cillary to its plenary authority over broadcasting. The Commission
has also exercised regulatory authority over CATV as ancillary to its
plenary jurisdiction over telephone companies and other common car-
riers. A CATV system consists of three components: a receiving appa-
ratus which receives radio and television signals either by antenna or
microwave transmission; a "headend" which converts, modifies and
modulates the signal to be transmitted; and the coaxial cable distribu-
tion system which carries the signal to the subscriber. 3 A cable televi-
sion operator may either construct the distribution system himself or
lease the distribution system by means of a lease-back arrangement 3
with a common carrier. Even where the CATV operator constructs
his own distribution system, he may lease space on the utility poles
owned by the telephone or power company rather than place the
coaxial cable on his own poles.
The FCC has asserted jurisdiction over these lease-back arrange-
mentS37 based on its authority under section 214 of the Communica-
tions Act,3 which requires a carrier to obtain a certificate of con-
venience and public necessity prior to constructing new lines or ex-
tending existing lines. Regulation was deemed necessary to insure fair
rates to CATV operators and to enable cable television to develop
independently of common carriers rather than as subsidiaries.39 Local
34. See id. at 175 n.43.
35. General Tel. Co. of Cal. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1969). A brief description
of the technology of cable television is set out in Barnett & Greenberg, Regulating CA TV
Systems: An Analysis of FCC Policy and an Alternative, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 562, 565-
66 (1969). See also Barnett & Greenberg, supra note 6; Johnson, New Technology: Its Effect
on Use and Management of the Radio Spectrum, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 521, 538-40.
36. A lease-back arrangement is one whereby the telephone company furnishes the cable
operator with the coaxial cable to carry the signal from the headend apparatus to drop lines
which lead to the subscribers' television sets. For a description of the service provided by the
telephone company see City of New York v. Comtel, Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 585, 588-90, 293
N.Y.S.2d 599, 602-04 (Sup. Ct. 1968), affd without opinion, 30 App. Div. 2d 1049, 294
N.Y.S.2d 981 (App. Dep't), affd without opinion, 25 N.Y.2d 922, 252 N.E.2d 285, 304
N.Y.S.2d 853 (1969).
37. General Tel. Co. of Cal., 13 F.C.C.2d 448 (1968).
38. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1970).
39. 13 F.C.C.2d at 463. The Commission, in an effort to enable CATV to be independent
of common carriers, has prohibited telephone companies or their affiliates from furnishing cable
Vol. 1971:115 1]
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regulations normally did not apply to CATV systems which employed
lease-back arrangements; in many situations, not even state agencies
had authority to supervise the terms of the agreement.4 0
While the Commission had previously concluded that CATV was
not a common carrier,4 this determination was not deemed applicable
to telephone companies which provided distribution systems. A cable
system was not a common carrier because the specific signals carried
were determined by the operator with the subscriber having no con-
trol;42 however, the telephone company's lease of channel service to
cable television operators who in turn determine the signals to be
carried, does constitute common carrier service.4 3
Under this theory, the Commission has insured that the rates
service themselves in their service area and has disallowed the telephone company from con-
structing a distribution system for an independent cable operator without first giving the CATV
owner the option of placing his own cable on the company's poles. 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-63.57
& 64.601-64.602 (1970). The Commission's authority to promulgate these regulations was sus-
tained in General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. United States, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1971).
40. See, e.g., New York v. Comtel, Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 585, 293 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct.
1968), affd without opinion, 30 App. Div. 2d 1049, 294 N.Y.S.2d 981 (App. Dep't), afj'd
without opinion, 25 N.Y.2d 922, 252 N.E.2d 285, 304 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1969). A city whose
regulatory authority over cable television is premised on its authority over the city streets cannot
regulate a cable system which has leased the distribution system from a common carrier. See
notes 193-206 infra and accompanying text. While the state utilities commission hasjurisdiction
over telephone companies, this jurisdiction may not include the authority to regulate services
provided by the common carrier in addition to telephone service. See note 214 infra. Also, if
the state utilities commission does not have general jurisdiction over cable television, it is
unlikely to be in a position to adequately regulate the lease-back arrangements. See notes 213-
15 infra and accompanying text.
41. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958). This position was upheld in subse-
quent proceedings. Philadelphia Tel. Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The Supreme Court indicated that CATV systems arc not common carriers within the meaning
of the Communications Act. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 169 n.29
(1967). For a discussion of conditions under which cable television would be providing common
carrier service, see notes 171-77 infra and accompanying text.
42. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
43. General Tel. Co. of Cal., 13 F.C.C.2d 448 (1968) upheld the Commission's assertion
of jurisdiction. In General Tel. Co. of Cal. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 888 (1969), the Commission's regulations were upheld. While section 214 of the Communi-
cations Act exempts from FCC regulation common carriers whose "lines" are wholly intras-
tate, 47 U.S.C. § 214(a)(1) (1970), the term "line," rather than referring to the physical object,
denotes points of origin and ultimate destination of the communication and not the facilities of
the specific carrier. The court in General Telephone indicated that it was accepting the Commis-
sion's definition of "line" to be "any channel of communication established by the use of
appropriate equipment." 413 F.2d at 402. Therefore, even if the actual distribution system were
intrastate and only local stations' signals were being carried, because broadcast signals are a
part of a "channel of interstate communication," id., the carriage is still a part of interstate
communications, and as such, subject to the regulation of the FCC. Id. at 403.
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charged by the common carrier are reasonable and that the service is
adequate. However, this authority has also been used to frustrate
efforts of CATV operators to circumvent local regulation through use
of lease-back arrangements. 4 The Commission considers local regula-
tions relevant to the determination of the necessity of issuing a certifi-
cate, as well as the conditions which should be imposed on the certifi-
cate, to ensure such regulations are not circumvented and frustrated
by lease-back agreements.4 5
Indirect regulation through section 214 certificates of convenience
has no effect upon CATV systems with their own distribution sys-
tems. 46 The Commission is, however, presently considering the possi-
bility of regulating agreements between cable television and public
utilities to attach the coaxial cable to poles owned by public utilities. 47
While such a move would greatly enlarge the number of CATV sys-
tems affected by the regulation, the substantive portion of such regu-
lation would nevertheless be limited as are present section 214 regula-
tions."
44. It is conceivable that the FCC could set standards for cable television systems and refuse
to issue the certificate to the telephone company if the cable system refused to comply. However,
the scope of these conditions would be limited by the limitations upon the Commission's
independent regulatory authority over cable television. See notes 147-49 infra and accompany-
ing text. See also Regulation of CA TV, supra note 3, at 856-58. Also, because of the limited
number of cable television systems affected by such regulations, it would be an unsatisfactory
means of regulation.
45. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 17 F.C.C.2d 33, at 9 (1969). However, the Commission
ordered Telepromter, Inc. and Sterling, Inc., New York City franchise holders, to cease further
construction of cable television facilities pending the outcome of hearings concerning the lease-
back arrangement between Comtel, Inc., a CATV system, and New York Telephone Co. to
provide cable service in New York City in competition with the franchise holders.
BROADCASTING, Oct. 12, 1970, at 26. This illustrates the problems likely to arise from the failure
to clearly define the regulatory authority of different levels of government and the resulting delay
and inconvenience to the cable operator and the public. For a discussion of federal, state and
local regulation of CATV, see section beginning at note 191 infra.
46. Because cable television is not a common carrier, see note 41 supra, it is not required
to obtain a certificate of convenience from the FCC to construct its own distribution facilities.
47. California Water & Tel. Co., 22 F.C.C.2d 586 (1970). Proceedings were initiated in
order to ascertain if there was a factual basis upon which the FCC could assert jurisdiction. Id.
In California Water & Tel. Co., 23 F.C.C.2d 840 (1970), the Commission ruled that the
factual inquiry could proceed prior to a final determination of the jurisdictional issue. The
Commission concluded that a finding of fact was necessary before the jurisdictional issue could
be decided.
48. The FCC's jurisdiction over cable television, being ancillary to its common carrier
jurisdiction, would be limited to those measures necessary to insure the efficacy of its common
carrier regulations. See notes 84-86 infra and accompanying text.
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THE PRESENT VIEW: CATV AS AN INDEPENDENT MEANS OF COMMU-
NICATION
In 1968 the FCC significantly changed its view of cable televi-
sion." Rather than focusing on CATV as a supplement to existing
broadcasting, the Commission expressed an interest in seeing it de-
velop as an independent means of communication."' An initial step
was taken in the promulgation of a rule requiring CATV systems with
more than 3500 subscribers to originate programming as a condition
of carrying programming originated by television broadcasters. 5'
Cable television was to become a "cablecaster" and operate as an
outlet for local self-expression.5 2 In addition, the FCC proposed
major revisions of the distant signal importation rules,53 which would
enable cable television to provide a greater variety of programming-
-though protection of local broadcasters is still deemed a relevant
goal. 4 Use of channel capacity for purposes other than carrying
broadcast signals was also considered,55 presaging a new role for
CATV as a common carrier56 and raising the concomitant issue of
49. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
While the Commission did begin to re-evaluate the function of cable television at this time, the
actual effect of the FCC's action since 1968 has been characterized as a freeze on CATV
development. See LeDuc, The FCC v. CA TVet aL.: A Theory of Regulatory Reflex Action, 23
FED. COM. B.J. 93 (1969).
50. It has been suggested further that there might be interconnection of local cable
systems and the terminal facilities of high capacity terrestrial and/or satellite intercity
systems, to provide numerous communication services to the home, business, and educa-
tional or other center on a regional or national basis. The advent of CATV program
origination in such cities as New York and Los Angeles (where there is also CATV
activity) gives rise to the possibility of a CATV origination network or networks. The
so-called 'wired city' concept embraces the possibility that television broadcasting might
eventually be converted, in whole or in part, to cable transmission (coupled with the use
of microwave or other intercity relay facilities), thereby freeing some broadcast spectrum
for other uses and making it technically feasible to have a greater number of national
and regional television networks and local outlets. 15 F.C.C.2d 417, at 9 (1968).
51. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972). These regulations have since
been held invalid, Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Jan. I1, 1972) (No. 71-506). For a discussion of the FCC's
authority to require CATV to originate programming see notes 80-106 infra and accompanying
text.
52. Midwest Tel., Inc., 13 F.C.C.2d 478, at 62 (1968).
53. Distant signal importation rules, first promulgated in 1966, limited the number of
signals a CATV system may import from another geographic area to its own community. See
notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
54. See Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, at 31-59 (1968).
55. 15 F.C.C.2d, at 26.
56. These proposals contemplated CATV systems having transmission capacity to lease to
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who would control and use the extra channels. The resulting regula-
tions envision cable television as providing three separate services:
continued transmission of programming originated by broadcast te-
levision, thereby functioning as a conduit for such programming;
functioning as a broadcaster by originating programming available
only to subscribers; and finally, to the extent that the channel capacity
is made available to transmit programming produced by third per-
sons, providing common carrier service.5 7 Anticipating that these reg-
ulations would have an effect on state and local regulatory attempts,
the FCC has also promulgated rules concerning the relationship of
federal and state regulation over cable television.58
Initially the new regulations raise questions as to the FCC's statu-
tory jurisdiction. Additionally, the substantive features of the impor-
tation, origination and common carrier regulations demand close
scrutiny to determine whether they are consistent with sound national
communications policy. Finally, the appropriateness of the FCC's
allocation of regulatory authority between federal and state govern-
ment needs to be considered.
The FCC's Jurisdiction to Regulate CA TV
The Importation Rules and Federal Copyright Policy. Premised
on the theory of ancillary jurisdiction, the rules regulating importa-
third persons and the capability of two-way communication. See notes 168-90 infra and accom-
panying text. The Commission is also setting minimum technical requirements including specifi-
cations for frequency boundaries, visual carrier frequency levels, aural carrier frequency levels,
channel frequency response, terminal isolation, and system radiation. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.601-
.617 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972).
57. The FCC proposals envision CATV operating under requirements similar to those
contained in the New York City franchise which requires that a cable system carry a minimum
of 17 channels by 1971: II to be used to transmit broadcast signals, one for origination by the
operator, three at the disposal of the city, and two to be leased for transmitting programming
produced by third persons. MAYOR'S REPORT 55-61. For a summary of the New York City
Franchise provisions see BROADCASTING, Aug. 13, 1970, at 19. For a discussion of the New
York franchise see Botein, CA TV Regulation: A Jumble of Jurisdictions, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV.
816, 817-20 (1970). The FCC indicated its preference concerning the future role of CATV when
it said: "We believe that the public interest would be-served by encouraging CATV to operate
as a common carrier on any remaining channels not utilized for carriage of broadcast signals
and CATV origination." 15 F.C.C.2d, at 26.
The regulations proposed by the FCC are discussed at: 24 F.C.C.2d 580 (1970) (Importation
of Distant Signals); 23 F.C.C.2d 825 (1970) (Program Origination); 25 F.C.C.2d 38 (1970)
(Minimum Channel Capacity and Other Technical Standards).
58. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972).
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tion are clearly within the authority granted to the FCC by the Com-
munications Act." The jurisdictional issue with respect to the rules is
not the FCC's authority under the Communications Act, but the
possibility that such rules are inconsistent with the policy of the Copy-
right Act." Because the Copyright Act grants a copyright holder the
exclusive right to "perform it [the copyrighted material] in public for
profit,"'  an issue raised at the inception of CATV was whether the
secondary transmission of broadcast signals constituted a "perform-
ance" within the meaning of the Act. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly"2 con-
cluded that the cable television operator intended the program to be
viewed by subscribers, and secondary transmission was, therefore, a
performance.13 The Supreme Court reversed, indicating that CATV
functionally had little in common with a broadcast system, but was
essentially a means of television signal reception and that CATV's
retransmission was therefore not a performance. 4 The effect of this
decision could be to give cable television a significant advantage over
small local broadcasters .8  However, to hold otherwise could result in
CATV's becoming a tool of the networks, thus destroying it as an
independent means of communication. The Court declined to render
a compromise decision," thereby leaving to Congress the task of
revising the Copyright Act if it so chose.6"
59. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
60. 17 U.S.C. § I etseq. (1970).
61. Id. § I(c).
62. 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967).
63. Id. at 879.
64. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Tel., Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1968).
65. CATV's competition is mainly from local television broadcasters, see notes 218-19 infra
and accompanying text; therefore, if cable television is able to obtain programming without
paying the copyright holder while broadcast stations must pay, the cable operator's competitive
position is improved.
66. The Solicitor General urged the Court to "... hold that CATV systems do perform
the programs they carry, but [to] 'imply' a license for the CATV 'performances.' This 'implied
in law' license would not cover all CATV activity but only those instances in which a CATV
system operates within the 'Grade B Contour' of the broadcasting station whose signal it
carries." Id. at 401 n.32. This result would have been similar to the proposed revision of the
Copyright Act. See note 78 infra.
67. Congress was thereafter presented with a proposed amendment to the Copyright Act,
but did not act upon the proposal. See note 116 infra.
For a discussion of the Copyright issue generally, see Comment, CA TV The Continuing
Copyright Controversy, 37 FORDlAM L. REV. 597 (1969); Note, CA TV and Copyright
Liability, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1514 (1967); Note, CATVand Copyright Liability, 52 VA. L. REv.
1505 (1966).
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In short, the policy of the Copyright Act6" is clearly to limit the
legal monopoly created therein to that granted by the statute. 9 Since
Fortnightly clearly placed secondary transmission by CATV outside
the legal monopoly created by the Copyright Act,70 any attempt by
the FCC to restrict secondary transmission is arguably inconsistent
with the Copyright Act and would result in an administrative nullifi-
cation of Fortnightly. While administrative rules may have the force
of law, they are not the equivalent of acts of Congress. The invalidity
of FCC regulations can result not only from the Commission's ex-
ceeding its authority under the Communications Act 7 l but also from
its promulgation of rules that are inconsistent with the policy of other
Acts of Congress. 7 Thus, if the FCC's importation rules do in fact
conflict with the Copyright Act, they are invalid. However, in Black
Hills Video Corp. v. FCC 3 the FCC's earlier rules limiting the impor-
tation of distant signals and requiring carriage and nonduplication of
local programming were held to be consistent with the Copyright
Act.7" The nonduplication and mandatory carriage rules were, in fact,
said to be effectuating the monopoly granted in the Act.75 By protect-
ing the broadcasting of copyrighted material from being duplicated
by one in the same geographic area who had not purchased the copy-
righted material, the rules protected the holder's exclusive grant. Oth-
erwise, the number of persons interested in paying for the material
68. 17 U.S.C. § 1(1970).
69. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
70. In the instant situation, Congress has, in conferring a limited monopoly upon
copyright holders, excluded from that monopoly the right to control the simultaneous
secondary transmission via CATV of broadcast signals containing copyrighted material.
To this extent, the copyrighted material is in the public domain, free to all who desire so
to use it ... [W]here the Copyright Act fails to confer private exploitation rights with
respect to material of a copyrightable nature, it is central to the policy of the Act that
such rights reside in the public and do not, on some other guise, inure to the benefit of
the copyright holder. Lipper, The Congress, The Court, and The Commissioners: A
Legacy of Fortnightly, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 521, 526-27 (1969).
71. FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
72. United States ex. rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949) (naval regulations held
invalid as inconsistent with the policy of other congressional acts); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co.
v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936); International Ry. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506 (1922)
(treasury regulations held invalid as beyond the agency's enabling legislation).
73. 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).
74. The FCC's jurisdiction to promulgate these rules was upheld in United States v. South-
western Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). See text accompanying note 30 supra.
75. 399 F.2d at 70.
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could be significantly reduced, thereby impairing the legal monopoly
created by the Act.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that all regulation of dis-
tant signal importation would be valid. The authority of the FCC to
regulate distant signal importation depends upon a factual finding
that without regulation, the present broadcast network would be in-
jured to the detriment of the public.7" Even if the regulation protects
broadcasters, it would be inconsistent with the policy of the Copyright
Act if it extended the copyright holder's monopoly. An earlier FCC
proposal, for example, which would have allowed a cable operator to
import programming only if he obtained the express permission of the
television station originating the programming,77 would have effec-
tively given control over secondary transmissions to the holder,78 and
would thus be invalid. 79 The new rules, essentially the same as the rules
validated in Black Hills Video, are thus valid because they do not give
the copyright holder additional control over his material.
The Program Origination and Common Carrier Regulations:
Plenary Jurisdiction. Cable television, by its nature, does not neces-
sarily fit into the category of "common carrier"8 or "broadcaster"',
as defined by the Communications Act. 2 While cable television could
76. Southwestern Cable Co. v. United States, 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
77. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, at T 38
(1968).
78. The television station originating the programming would have to obtain from the
copyright holder the right to give this consent-presumably for a fee which would be ultimately
paid by the CATV operator. See Who's Afraid of CA TV? 202. For a discussion of the retrans-
mission consent proposals, see notes 112-13 infra and accompanying text.
79. See Lipper, supra note 70, at 528-29.
80. A common carrier is one who leases the means of transmitting to third persons. 47
U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970). It is arguable that the CATV operator who only transmits program-
ming originated by television operators is a common carrier because the subscribers, in effect,
"lease" the transmission facilities. However, as noted, note 41 supra and accompanying text,
the. cable operator, retaining control over the signals carried, is not considered to be a common
carrier. The subscribers, rather than "leasing" transmission facilities, are paying for a service
-better television reception.
Should channel capacity be leased to third persons who provide the programming, the cable
operator would be a common carrier. Once the operator begins offering common carrier service
the FCC would have direct authority over the system. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1970).
81. A cable system engaged solely in secondary transmission of television programming is
not engaged in broadcasting, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 399-
401 (1968). However, if the cable system, by either producing its own programming or purchas-
ing programming from another producer, becomes the primary transmitter of programming, it
would become a broadcaster within the meaning of the Act.
82. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). Currently, however, there is pending an amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934 which would give the FCC explicit regulatory authority over cable
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be so operated as to constitute a "common carrier" or a "broadcast-
er," it is not clear that the FCC can require CATV to operate in such
a manner. The Commission has asserted its authority to require cable
operators to meet specific program origination and common carrier
requirements by making these requirements pre-conditions to the
carrying of any broadcast signals."3 The theory advanced by the Com-
mission is that having ancillary jurisdiction over cable television to
regulate the broadcast signals carried, the Commission can condition
the carriage of the signals on the operator's meeting specified require-
ments. But while setting conditions can be a creative way of imple-
menting the congressional purpose in establishing the regulatory
agency, 4 it does not follow that conditions can be used to extend an
agency's authority over an area not contained in the original delega-
tion of authority. The issue presented is not whether conditions can
be used when there are alternative means provided by the statute,8 but
whether conditions can be used to accomplish indirectly what cannot
be done directly. The validity of the regulations must depend upon the
authority of the Commission to assert direct jurisdiction." Otherwise,
the FCC would be permitted, in practical effect, to amend its own
grant of authority.
Midwest Video Corp. v. United States8 held invalid the FCC's
requirement that a CATV owner originate programming. In Midwest
Video, the court appeared to adopt an ancillary theory of the FCC's
jurisdiction over cable television. 8 Because the Commission did not
have direct jurisdiction over cable television, said the court, condition-
ing carriage of broadcast signals on the owner's compliance with the
origination requirement was beyond the authority delegated by the
Communications Act. 9 If the Commission lacks the authority to
television. S. 792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) was introduced and referred to the Commerce
Committee on Feb. 17, 1971.
83. See, e.g., 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 422 (1968) conditioning the carriage of television broadcast
signals upon CATV originating programming.
84. Cf. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959) (pointing out
the possibility of using conditioning power as an alternative to other means provided within the
statute).
85. Id.
86. See Note, Administrative Regulation by Conditions in Certificates of Public Conveni-
ence and Necessity, 21 STAN. L. REV. 188, 194-97 (1968).
87. 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971).
88. "The Commission's power to adopt rules requiring cablecasting to the extent that it
exists must be based on the Commission's right to adopt rules that are reasonably ancillary to
its responsibilities in the broadcasting field." Id. at 1326 (emphasis added).
89. Id.
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require that the cable operator function as a cablecaster, an attempt
to require the cable operator to function as a common carrier is
equally invalid.
However, the decision in Midwest Video appears to offer an alter-
native ground for holding the origination requirement invalid. Judge
Gibson, in a concurring opinion, expressed the view that the regula-
tion was "confiscatory and hence arbitrary" but that the FCC had
direct jurisdiction over cable television." While the majority opinion
makes it clear that it is holding that the FCC does not have direct
authority over CATV, language in the opinion indicates that the court
also considered the regulation to be arbitrary.9 If the majority opin-
ion accepted Gibson's view of the substantive defect in the regula-
tions, a question is raised as to the need to reach the broader issue of
the Commission's jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the court's holding in Midwest Video, it is sub-
mitted that a theory of jurisdiction based on a broad interpretation
of section 152(a)92 of the Communications Act would support the
FCC's direct authority over CATV. In United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co.93 the Court indicated that "the Act's provisions . . .
[apply] to all interstate and foreign communication by wire and ra-
dio," 4 thus giving a broad interpretation of the Commission's au-
thority. This authority is not static; rather, the court "view[s] the
Federal Communications Act as the kind of legislation where Con-
gress has delegated to the executive agency not only the power to
regulate in a certain broad area of national interest, but the power of
supersession as well. The dynamic, rapidly changing technology of
radio and television broadcasting is ill-suited to specific Congres-
sional guidelines to regulatory authority."9 The legislative history of
90. [Tlhe Commission's particular order on origination, at this time at least, would
be extremely burdensome and perhaps remove from the CATV field many entrepreneurs
who do not have the resources, talent and ability to enter the broadcasting field. The
order is thus oppressive and arbitrary at this time. . . . Id. at 1328 (Gibson, J., concur-
ring).
91. A high probability exists that cablecasting will not be self-supporting and that the
burden thereof would likely cause substantial increase in the amount that subscribers are re-
quired to pay for CATV service and in some instances may drive the CATV operators out of
business. Id. at 1327. Compare note 90 supra.
92. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970).
93. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
94. Id. at 167.
95. T.V. Pix Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459, 465 (D. Nev. 1968), affdper curiam 396
U.S. 556 (1970).
1166 [Vol. 1971:1151
CABLE TV
the Act also indicates that Congress intended to give the Commission
broad jurisdiction, with "regulatory power over all forms of electrical
communication . . . ."I Cable television would be a means of com-
munication covered under section 152(a) even though it may not func-
tion as a broadcaster or a common carrier within the Act's express
language.
The fact that cable television may be covered under Title I of the
Communications Act does not necessarily give the Commission regu-
latory authority. Title I does not delegate specific powers to the Com-
mission; rather, the grants are made under Titles II and III of the
Communications Act. The Act contemplates a public utility type of
regulation of common carriers under Title II and a licensing proce-
dure for broadcasters under Title III. Although under section 154(i)
"[t]he Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules
and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this
chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions," 7 this
section could be interpreted to be only a general restatement of the
specific delegation made elsewhere in the Act and not an independent
source of rule-making authority.
However, the legislative history of the Act, reflective of a Congres-
sional intent that the FCC have a great deal of discretion, would
indicate that the authority delegated under Titles II and III is not
exhaustive. 8 Rather, these titles represent congressional guidance on
regulation of known means of communication at the time the Act was
enacted but do not exclude different types of regulation over means
of communication subsequently developed. A cable television system,
possessing characteristics of a common carrier and of a broadcaster,
presents a technological advance not contemplated when the Act was
written.9
The Court in Southwestern Cable upheld the promulgation of the
FCC's distant signal importation regulations on the basis of section
154(i).oo The decision could be narrowly interpreted as holding that
96. S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1934).
97. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1970).
98. National Assoc. of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 922 (1970); General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 402 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 888 (1969). The court in National Assoc. of Theatre Owners indicated that if the circum-
stances developed to justify regulation of television subscription rates, the FCC could impose
such rates even though Title I I I does not grant this type of authority.
99. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1968).
100. Id. at 181.
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authority under this section only extends to that necessary to pre-
serve the power delegated in the other titles. However, the language
of the opinion indicates that the limits of authority under the section
are a function of the particular circumstances. In these circumstances,
said the Court, "the Commission's order limiting further expansion
of [CATV] service pending appropriate hearings did not exceed or
abuse its authority under the Communications Act."'' 1 Interpreting
section 154(i) as an independent source of regulatory authority rather
than limiting it to a restatement of the powers delegated in Titles II
and III, gives the Commission authority to deal with emerging forms
of communication and is consistent with the intent of Congress. This
interpretation was echoed in T. V. Pix Inc. v. Taylor'02 where the
Court said: "[S]ome day a case may be made for the validity of
F.C.C. public utility type of regulation of community antenna com-
panies as reasonably necessary to meet the broad responsibilities dele-
gated to it . ... ,,03 Therefore, as noted in Southwestern Cable, even
though cable television possesses characteristics of a common carrier
and broadcaster, the Commission should not be restricted to the regu-
latory tools specified in Titles II and III.
The setting of conditions which must be met if a cable system is
to be allowed to carry broadcast signals would appear to be an appro-
priate means of effectuating the purposes of the Communications Act.
The Commission, under an obligation to make available a rapid and
efficient communication system,' may determine that the conditions
set will serve this end. The regulations requiring program origination
or a minimum channel capacity sufficient to carry out a common
carrier function are in a sense a departure from traditional regula-
tions. Rather than prohibiting, they require affirmative action. These
regulations, however, find justification in communications regulatory
policy. Cable television by its nature is a natural or technical mono-
poly105-there is likely to be only one distribution system in one geo-
graphic area." 6 Therefore, the FCC should be able to insure that those
who acquire this -monopoly act in a way to effectuate national com-
munications policy.
101. Id.
102. 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), affdper curiam 396 U.S. 556 (1970).
103. Id. at 465.
104. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
105. See note 198 infra and accompanying text.
106. Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322, 1328 (8th Cir. 1971) (Gibson,
J., concurring).
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Substantive Features of the FCC Regulations
The FCC clearly has jurisdiction to regulate the importation of
distant signals. 0 The Commission's authority to require CATV ori-
gination of programming and leasing of channel capacity to third
persons is less clear. 01 However, even assuming that the FCC does not
presently have jurisdiction to require program origination and com-
mon carriage, the substantive provisions of the program origination
and common carrier regulations deserve attention, not only because
of possible congressional action which would cure the jurisdictional
defect, 0 19 but also because the regulations are presently applicable to
cable systems which voluntarily originate programming or lease chan-
nel capacity.
The Importation Rules. The Commission in 1968 altered its views
concerning the importation of distant signals." 0 Previously, the rules
had required carriage of local signals, nonduplication of local pro-
gramming on other channels, and strictly limited importation., The
rules proposed in 1968 provided that a cable system must carry local
stations, and that, to the extent necessary to provide the programming
of the three networks and one independent station, additional signals
could be imported."2 Other programming could be imported, but only
after obtaining consent from the copyright holder for retransmission
by the originating station. 13 While the proposed rules still exhibited
an element of protection for local broadcasters, they reflected the
FCC's recognition of cable television as an independent means of
communication, with a concomitant view that CATV should pay for
the programming as do broadcasters.
The Commission did not act upon the proposals, but issued the
Second Notice of Proposed Rule Making"4 proposing alternatives to
107. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 87-96 supra and accompanying text.
109. See note 82 supra.
110. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
111. The Commission had concluded that because the CATV system did not have to com-
pete with the broadcaster for programming but could obtain programming free by importation,
the competition between the local broadcaster and CATV was unfair. First Order and Report,
38 F.C.C. 683, 699 (1965).
112. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1107(b) (1970).
113. 15 F.C.C.2d at 38. For a discussion of these proposed rules see Botein, F.C.C.'s
Proposed CA TV Regulations, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 244 (1970); Who's Afraid of CA TV?. 195-
211.
114. 24 F.C.C.2d 580 (1970).
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the retransmission consent rules. Inaction on the earlier proposals was
attributed to the unwillingness of cable television to enter into compe-
tition with broadcasters." 5 Also, Congress had not acted upon pro-
posed revisions to the Copyright Act which would have clarified con-
gressional intent"' and, more importantly, would have remedied the
jurisdictional flaw in the proposals." 7
The alternative proposals were initially restricted to the top 100
markets," 8 and would have allowed cable television to import four
independent broadcast signals in addition to carrying local signals.""
The four imported signals could be selected at.the discretion of the
operator; the commercials from the imported programming would be
deleted and replaced with commercials provided by the local television
station.12 0 CATV would be allowed to import any number of noncom-
mercial educational stations if the local educational station did not
object, but if requested to do so, appeals for money by the local entity
would be substituted for appeals on the imported programming. Also,
as a condition of importing distant signals, CATV would be required
to make a payment equal to five percent of subscriber revenue to
public broadcasting. ' 2
115. Id. at 3.
116. S. 543, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). This bill would have defined "performance" so as
to include secondary transmissions. Id. at § 101. However, secondary transmission of material
for reception in the area of primary reception would not infringe upon the exclusive rights of
the copyright holder. Id. at § I l(a)(3). Liability for secondary transmission would be limited
to a reasonable license fee where the area of reception is not encompassed by any transmitting
facility. Id. at § lll(B)(i). The reason given for Congress' failure to act on the bill was the
complexity of the CATV issue. BROADCASTING, Aug. 24, 1970, at 5. For a discussion of the
congressional proposals concerning revision of the Copyright Act, see Botein, supra note 57, at
839-43. It is likely that new legislation, having the advance approval of both the cable and
broadcast interests, will be introduced in the current session. BROADCASTING, Nov. 15, 1971,
at 17.
117. See notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
118. The "top 100 markets" are defined in terms of the number of television households
and the average number of hours viewed by each household. The major television markets are
specified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.51 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. -(1972).
119. 24 F.C.C.2d at 5.
120. The commercials would have been provided by the local independent UHF station; if
there were no independent UHF stations in a market with both VHF and UHF network
broadcasters (intermixed market), commercials would be provided by the local UHF affiliate;
in an all-VHF or all-UHF market, the commercials of all local stations could be used if no
new UHF applications were filed for two years following adoption of the rules; and commercials
of any local stations could be used if no new UHF applications were filed for two years following
adoption of the rules; and commercials of any local station could be substituted upon a showing
by the broadcaster that his ability to adequately serve the public was threatened by cable
television.
121. 24 F.C.C.2d at 6.
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Following hearings on the proposed rules, the Commission modi-
fied its importation rules, deleting the commercial substitution provi-
sions. The new rules require that a CATV system must carry all tele-
vision stations within whose specified zone the system is located and
stations significantly viewed in the CATV community. 2 In addition,
a cable system will be permitted to import signals to provide its sub-
scribers with "minimum service."' The nonduplication provisions of
the previous regulations have been changed giving a broadcaster
located in the CATV community protection from signals carried on
the cable furnishing the same programming he has purchased and
broadcast, for up to two years. 124
The rules are designed to protect television broadcasters and at the
same time enable CATV to provide a greater diversity of program-
ming. The FCC has concluded that to allow cable television to freely
import programming would subject local broadcasters to "unfair
competition."' 2  However, while cable television does not make a
payment for the programming as does the local broadcaster, neither
does CATV receive advertising revenue as does the broadcaster origi-
nating the programming. Moreover, by accepting programming with
the advertising inserted by the originating station, CATV is in a
position similar to a network affiliate broadcasting network program-
ming except that it is not paid by the station originating the program-
ming as is the affiliate. Were the cable operator to receive advertising
revenue without paying for the program, it might be appropriate to
label it as unfair competition. 12 However, this is not the case. If cable
122. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-.63 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. -. (1972).
123. Minimum service under the new rules varies depending on the size of the local television
market. A cable system in the top 50 markets may carry three networks and three independent
stations; those in the second 50 may carry three networks and two independent stations; while
a cable system in a smaller market, below 100, can carry three networks and one independent
station. Cable systems located within the top 100 markets would be allowed to carry two signals
in addition to those it is required to carry. Id. at §§ 76.61-.63, 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972). How-
ever, any signal imported to provide minimum service would be considered as one of these
additional signals. Id. A smaller market cable system would only be allowed to provide mini-
mum service. Id. at § 76.59, 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972). A cable system located outside the
broadcast zone of any commercial station can carry broadcast signals without restriction. Id.
at § 76.57, 37 Fed. Reg. -. (1972).
124. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.91-.159 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. -(1972).
125. See note I IIsupra.
126. FuTuRE OF CABLE TELEVISION 19-20.
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competition is not per se unfair, the mere threat that such competition
might put a local broadcaster out of business, is not sufficient justifi-
cation for a policy of protecting the broadcaster. It must be shown
that such competition will adversely affect the total service available
to the public. 2
A more compelling argument for regulation is the adverse effect
upon the total programming available in the absence of regulation.
Because the present means of CATV transmission is by coaxial cable,
the cost makes it unavailable to individuals living in areas of low
population concentration and individuals unwilling to pay the sub-
scription fee. Encouragement of local broadcasters provides a means
for making network programming as well as programming of a local
nature available to all individuals. Cable television profits may result
in a deterioration rather than an improvement in programming avail-
able to the general public because the development of cable television
under free importation' of programming will fractionalize the market,
resulting in a reduction in advertising revenue available for program-
ming.121
The use of free distant signals reduces revenue available for pro-
gramming by eroding the advertising base. Cable television, carrying
the additional programming, reduces the audience watching the local
station, which results in a corresponding loss of advertising revenue.
The station whose signal is being imported would receive additional
advertising revenue because of the increase in audience size. However,
the advertising value of a distant audience is about two-thirds the
value of local audience;" 9 therefore, there is a net loss in advertising
revenue. "As a symptom of this reduction in revenues, copyright
owners would complain (as they now in fact are complaining) that
local stations are no longer able to pay enough for particular pro-
gramming because the stations are forced to compete against local
cable systems that import the same or similar programs without pay-
ment to copyright owners."1 3° The loss of advertising revenue reduces
the amount of money available for programming.
127. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) and Carroll Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958) clearly indicate that adverse economic effect upon
individual broadcasters is not sufficient reason to protect the broadcaster from competition. The
factor becomes a relevant consideration if such competition causes a loss in the total service
available to the public.
128. FUTURE OF CABLE TELEVISION 21.
129. IMPACT OF CABLE GROWTH 71.
130. FUTURE OF CABLE TELEVISION 21.
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The commercial substitution proposal, it should be noted, would
have benefited those stations least hurt rather than the ones suffering
the actual damage. CATV has the greatest impact in markets with
few broadcast stations.131 Given the present technology, duplication
protection, and required carriage of local stations, cable television, at
forty percent penetration, is likely to reduce revenue for all stations
from local audiences by about eighteen percent in the top 100 mar-
kets, but the reduction in smaller markets will be in excess of thirty
percent.3 2 Commercial substitution, because it would not have been
13 1. While it is difficult to forecast the actual effect on advertising revenue, the following
hypothetical situation indicates that substitution of commercials would not offset the net loss
of revenue. Assuming that in Market A there are four off-the-air broadcast signals, cable
television has fifty percent penetration, the number of viewing hours are evenly split among all
signals available, and each television household views television one-half of the viewing hours,
the importation of four distant signals by cable television will reduce the local audience by one-
fourth which results in net revenue loss of $150 per hundred television households. The advertis-
ing value of a television household is estimated to be about $25 per year. IMPACT OF CABLE
GROWTH 37. Assuming that there are 100 television households in Market A, approximately
twenty-five (one-half of the fifty CATV subscribers) will be viewing the imported distant signals
resulting in a revenue loss of $650 to the local broadcasters. However, this distant signal
audience is worth $16 per viewer (distant audience advertising value is approximately two-thirds
that of a local audience, id. at 47, to the broadcasters whose signals are being imported resulting
in revenue of $400. The net revenue loss after subtracting that gained by the distant broadcaster
from that lost by the local broadcasters would be $150 for the 100 television households. If the
cost of the substitution equipment would have been borne by the broadcaster benefiting from
substitution, as the FCC contemplated, Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.2d
580, at 8 (1970), the market would have to include at least 20,000 television households before
the amount above the cost of substitution, without considering selling costs, will be equal to
net revenue lost. The cost of the substitution equipment will be about $50,000 per year. L.
JOHNSON, THE PROBLEM OF PROTECTING LOCAL BROADCASTERS 6 (Rand Corp. 1970). Of the
20,000 household viewers, 5,000 would be viewing the imported signals. The value gained from
having advertising inserted at the local level would be about $10 per viewer (local audience value
minus distant audience value) or $50,000 for a 20,000 television household market. This figure,
based on the assumption of equal division between all available signals, is unrealistic. Because
network programming is unavailable for commercial substitution, the actual number viewing
distant signals available through substitution proposals will be less than one-half of the subscri-
bers. Thus, the actual number of television households in the market would have to be corre-
spondingly larger even given the other assumptions.
132. IMPACT OF CABLE GROWTH 17. It is estimated that under the present conditions cable
television will ultimately reach about forty to forty-five percent of the television households. Id.
at 8. However, penetration is likely to be greater in those areas with fewer local stations. In an
area with less than three local stations, penetration is likely to be about sixty percent. Id. at
17. Therefore, the reduction in revenue in smaller markets is likely to be greater than the
estimate made assuming forty percent penetration.
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applicable to the smaller markets,' would not confer benefits to
compensate for the corresponding loss.'
The rules under consideration by the FCC are in effect a return
to the rules in effect prior to the retransmission consent and commer-
cial substitution proposals.135 However, one significant change by the
FCC is recognition that the independent UHF station will benefit
rather than be harmed by development of cable television. 3 In mar-
kets where there is an independent UHF station, the audience has
already been significantly fractionalized because the network pro-
gramming is normally available resulting in several stations dividing
the viewing audience. The independent UHF broadcaster, suffering
from technical disadvantages in competing with VH F broadcasting,' 3
will increase his revenue by about 51 percent by having his signal
carried over a cable system having 40 percent penetration. The car-
riage by cable eliminates the technical difficulties of receiving UHF
signals, and while the audience may be further fractionalized, the
UHF broadcaster increases his audience by having his signal techni-
cally equal to VHF signal. 13 The revenue of network UHF stations
in a market with VHF network systems is also increased by cable
television. 39 The actual result with no restrictions on distant signal
importation, assuming required carriage of local stations and duplica-
tion protection, "' would benefit local UHF stations rather than cause
irreparable damage and at the same time would encourage the rapid
development of CATV.
133. The FCC indicated in its proposal that only CATV systems located within the top 100
markets would be able to utilize commercial substitution and import additional signals. Second
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.2d 580 (1970).
134. See notes 131-32 supra.
135. That is, the rules, first promulgated in 1966, which limited distant signal importation,
and required carriage and nonduplication of local signals. These rules are discussed in text
accompanying notes 27-29 and 73-76 supra.
136. The FCC's previous regulations have been premised on a concern that unregulated
CATV development would preclude future UHF stations from developing and seriously impair
the economic viability of existing UHF stations. See, e.g., note 120 supra. The Commission has
for some time been encouraging the development of UHF television stations as a means of
increasing the number of channels available in a geographic area. See Webbink, supra note 26.
137. UHF stations are at a competitive disadvantage because the reception is of a lower
quality than VHF, not all television sets in use are equipped to receive UHF signals, and the
channel selector makes it more difficult to switch to a UHF channel. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE
ch. 7, at 24-25.
138. IMPACT OF CABLE GROWTH 71.
139. Id.
140. See note 135 supra.
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While the rules recognize that UHF television stations do not need
to be protected from CATV, they do not adequately protect against
the adverse impact of cable television on the smaller market television
broadcasters, and hence, do not touch on the problem of insuring
adequate programming in rural areas. In the smaller markets to the
extent that cable television is allowed to import signals necessary to
provide the programming of the three networks and one indepen-
dent-that is, minimum service"'-the revenue of the local broad-
caster will be reduced.4 2 The impact of additional importation would
not appear to be any more significant than in the larger markets. The
fractionalization and revenue reduction would be attributable to the
importation presently allowed. Therefore, as long as the Commission
is willing to allow cable television to import signals to provide mini-
mum service, the interests of television viewers for whom cable service
is presently unavailable are best served by allowing cable television to
rapidly develop less expensive means of transmission, such as micro-
wave. 13 This will only be accomplished as cable television is able to
expand its facilities to generate the funds necessary to support the
research.
The probable impact of cable television importation on total
revenue available for programming would be approximately a nine
percent reduction.' The loss is small enough to be absorbed in an-
nual revenue growth. If the concern is for the development of indepen-
dent UHF stations in the larger market,1 5 the free importation of
signals will promote UHF stations and at the same time allow the full
potential of cable television to be realized.
The new rules, while avoiding the defects of the commercial substi-
tution proposals, do not significantly alter the importation restric-
tions previously imposed on cable television. Those systems located
in the larger television markets will be allowed to import more pro-
gramming than under previous rules. But the rules do not protect the
smaller market broadcaster, and it is questionable whether the unlim-
ited importation, assuming non-duplication protection, would add
141. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
142. The Rocky Mountain Broadcasters Association has criticized the FCC regulations for
failing to adequately deal with the problems in small markets. See BROADCASTING, Nov. 22,
1971, at40.
143. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
144. IMPACT OF CABLE GROWTH 77.
145. See note 136 supra.
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significantly to the adverse impact possible under the rules in both the
larger and smaller markets.' Therefore, it is questionable whether the
administrative cost of enforcing the rules is justified. Also, the rules
in effect amount to a continuance of the FCC's freeze on the develop-
ment of CATV 47 which may over the long run be more harmful to
the public interest than unlimited importation. 8
The Program Origination Rules. The FCC, in 1968, issued regula-
tions requiring CATV systems with more than 3500 subscribers to
originate programming as a condition to carrying broadcast sig-
nals.' Advertising was to be carried at natural breaks in the pro-
gramming 50 to help meet the cost of origination.'5' The argument
given for requiring CATV origination was to provide an additional
source of local programming and thus encourage diversity in available
programming. 5 1 While recognizing the requirement could further
fractionalize the local audience, the Commission concluded that the
possible harm to existing broadcasters was outweighed by the poten-
tial benefits to be derived from mandatory cablecasting.'5 3
The program origination regulations were, of course, held invalid
in Midwest Video Corp. v. United States,'54 ostensibly on jurisdic-
tional grounds.'55 But because the jurisdictional defect is arguable,"',
and is at any rate likely to be cured by congressional action,'" it is
appropriate in spite of Midwest Video to consider the merits of the
program origination rule.
The major argument against the rule is that its effect on diversifi-
cation of local programming will be minimal while the economic
burden it imposes will be great. The provision allowing advertising,
146. See notes 131-34 supra and accompanying text.
147. See note 49 supra.
148. The freeze, by precluding CATV from fully developing or, at best, by slowing this
development, will deny potential innovative CATV services to the public. See note 3 supra.
149. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972).
150. Natural breaks are defined by the FCC to be breaks in programming over which the
cable operator has no control. Id. at § 76.217, 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972). If the programming
being presented were a movie, the natural breaks would be at the beginning and the end of the
movie.
151. Id.
152. First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
153. Id.
154. 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971).
155. See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
156. See text accompanying notes 92-106 supra.
157. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
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for example, has been criticized as an unnecessary inducement to
present programming which will appeal to a mass audience and will,
thus, be indistinguishable from present broadcast programming. 15 8
Prohibiting advertising, however, could have serious effects on the
financing of programming, making necessary an increase in subscrip-
tion fees or a reduction in plant investment.'
Even with the inclusion of the advertising provision, however, the
financial burden imposed by the origination requirement is not re-
solved, as the programming would still not be self-sustaining.' For
example, it is doubtful under present conditions that program origina-
tion by cable television has any effect on CATV's ability to attract
subscribers.' The question thus becomes which aspect of CATV's
operation will be cut back in order to cover the cost of program
origination? Paying for the originated programming out of subscriber
revenue would not appear to be justified. Either other services will be
cut back or fees will be raised, each of which would likely result in a
loss of subscribers. An alternative source of revenue may be common
carrier operations."6 Cable television's greatest potential is said to lie
in the area of providing more people the opportunity to present televi-
sion programming through leased channels.6 3 However, taking
revenue from this area will result in slowing its potential development
or increasing the cost of access.
Quite apart from the problem of cost, it is questionable whether
the origination rules would actually encourage the development of
more and better programming of a local nature. Under these rules, a
cable television operator could satisfy the origination requirement by
purchasing virtually the same type of programming as that obtained
by importing a distant signal.6 4 It is thus difficult to see how the rules
would achieve the goal of providing a local outlet of expression.
158. Who's Afraid of CATV?215-16.
159. FUTURE OF (CABLE TELEVISION 47.
160. Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322, 1327 (8th Cir. 1971).
161. IMPACT OF CABLE GROWTH 27. A cable system in Lakewood, Ohio (a Cleveland
suburb), attempted to use program origination as the principle means of attracting subscribers.
Six broadcast channels could be adequately received in the area. The cable system offered I 1
to 14 hours a day of programming, six of which were devoted to locally-oriented programming.
The system attracted only 1500 subscribers out of a possible 25,000.
162. Who's Afraid of CATV?217-18.
163. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ch. 7, at 10.
164. FUTURE OF CABLE TELEVISION 44.
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Although this problem is easily solved by amending the rule, a more
intractable problem remains. Any realistic attempt to improve the
quality of locally-oriented programming must take into account the
circumstances of each locality.
[T]he need for localism varies considerably from one locality to another de-
pending on the adequacy of the local press, the number of nearby radio and
television stations, the adequacy of local transportation as a partial substitute
for communication and other factors. Many instances arise in which a uniform
national regulatory policy confers only a modest or zero direct benefit to some
localities, while imposing a concealed loss in the form of other benefits fore-
gone. 165
The problem of locally-oriented programming is, thus, most effec-
tively handled at the local level. Rule making by the FCC which seeks
to deal with the problem will not satisfactorily promote the public in-
terest.' The present potential of cablecasting to add significantly to
program diversity is not great enough to justify subsidization with
revenue from other sources, especially when such a subsidy might
delay the development of common carrier facilities which, in fact,
provide the greatest hope for achieving diversity and locally-oriented
programming."t 7
The Minimum Channel Capacity, or "Common Carrier" Rules.
The FCC indicated in Notice of Inquiry6' that it was interested in
setting technical standards for cable television, including a require-
ment that CATV lease transmission facilities to third persons."'8 The
Commission invited comments on regulations requiring that a mini-
mum number of channels be provided and that the system be capable
of two-way communications. 0 The regulations are significant in that
they, in effect, require CATV systems to operate as common carriers.
It is through providing the means whereby many people will have
an inexpensive way to transmit their programming to the public that
cable television is "the most promising avenue to diversity."'' The
FCC's regulation of cable television should, then, seek to enhance
rather than thwart growth in the area of providing common carrier
service.
165. Id. at 47-48.
166. Id.
167. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ch. 7, at 9.
168. 25 F.C.C.2d 38 (1970).
169. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 427 (1968).
170. 25 F.C.C.2d 38, at 8 (1970).
171. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ch. 7, at 9. See also Barnett & Greenberg, supra note 35, at
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The Commission, under the new regulations, requires that all
cable systems in the top 100 markets provide at least twenty chan-
nels.172 For every channel used to carry broadcast programming, these
systems must have one channel available for other uses. 73 Each cable
system will also have to provide without charge one public access
channel, one channel to state and local government, and one channel
for educational use. 74 The cable operator would be allowed to lease
any unused channel capacity including unused time on the public
access channels. 75 A cable operator will be required to add an addi-
tional channel to his system whenever all of his present channels are
being used on eighty percent of the weekdays, eighty percent of the
time during any three hour period for six weeks. 76 The latter require-
ment is designed to insure the continuing availability of unused chan-
nel capacity. The FCC also requires that cable systems be capable of
providing two-way communication. 77
In connection with the provision setting minimum channel capac-
ity and other technical standards, the interrelated policy questions of
financing and control of the channel capacity must be considered. 7 8
172. 47 C.F.R. § 251(a)(1) (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. -(1972).
173. Id. at § 251(a)(2), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972). The FCC has expressed concern that,
unless minimum channel capacity is required, cable owners will only provide the capacity neces-
sary for the carriage of broadcast signals. The FCC Chairman stated: "In sum, [the commis-
sionersi emphasize that the cable operator cannot accept the distant or overlapping signals that
will be made available without also accepting the obligation to provide for substantial non-
broadcast bandwidth. The two are integrally linked in the public interest judgment we have
made." FCC Chairman's Letter 27.
174. 47 C.F.R. § 251(a)(4) (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972). The Commission hopes that
this regulation will open up new outlets for local expression and increased experimentation with
possible uses of local television. FCC Chairman's Letter 28-29.
175. 47 C.F.R. § 251(a)(7) (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972). This requirement avoids the
possibility of unused time on the dedicated channels while there is someone willing to pay for the
transmission facilities.
176. Id. at § 251(a)(8), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972). A cable system will have six months to
add the additional channel.
177. Id. at § 251(a)(3), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972). As has been noted, see text accompany-
ing note 172 supra, these regulations are only applicable to CATV in the top 100 markets; the
common carrier rules will be applicable to new systems, while existing systems will have five
years to comply. Existing CATV in smaller markets will have to meet these requirements when
the system is substantially rebuilt. 47 C.F.R. § 251(c)(1972), 37 Fed. Reg. -(1972).
178. "The Federal Communications Commission must be responsible for the human and
sociological implications of its decisions, as well as the economic, technological, and political
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Under the new rules the CATV operator has discretion in determining
how the capacity is to be used, which allows the use of a valuable
public resource in a manner which may or may not be for the benefit
of the public. The possibility of interconnecting cable systems"' prom-
ises to concentrate control over programming to a greater extent than
is the case in the present broadcast industry. 80 The Commission's
regulations envision that access will be on a nondiscriminatory first-
come,, first-served basis. 181 Presumably access to the dedicated chan-
nels would be limited to the indicated uses.' However, the dedication
to prescribed uses raises a problem of determining the appropriate
group to bear the cost of the free channel capacity. In requiring that
the cable operator provide the service free, the Commission has effec-
tively imposed the cost on the subscriber. This may also have the
consequences. The structure and operation of our country's communication system--especially
the mass media-affect, among many other things, the sense of 'community' of those who both
benefit from and are used by the system." 25 F.C.C.2d 38, at 8 (1970) (concurring statement
of Commissioner Johnson).
179. One future possibility is to interconnect cable systems, making possible cable networks.
See note 50 supra. Interconnection offers specific advantages to offset the resultant potential
for concentration of program control. The FCC has rightly identified as one of the advantages
of CATV the potential for presenting specialized programming. However, the Commission has
only concerned itself with programming oriented toward geographic groups. Interconnection
also offers the potential for programming aimed at groups defined by employment, cultural
interests, and educational needs. The possibility of presenting programming of limited appeal
becomes economically feasible if the particular group can be reached within several geographic
areas to increase the audience. Further, advertising revenue will result because the advertiser,
rather than paying solely for the number of viewers, will pay to reach a special interest audience.
180. The owner of cable television, even if limited in the number of cable systems he could
own, would still have complete control over the programming reaching subscribers within one
geographic area. See Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentration, Part I: Control of
Cable Systems by Local Broadcasters, 22 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1970) for a discussion of media
control. The potential control over communications through ownership of the distribution
system has prompted one group to propose that non-profit corporations be created to own the
distribution systems. The operation of the system would be financed by leasing out channels to
the highest bidders with several channels retained for free public use. Recommendation of Center
of Policy Research, reported in BROADCASTING, July 20, 1970, at 45. New York City, in
requiring a minimum channel capacity, established a board to regulate the rates charged for
leasing the channels. MAYOR'S REPORT 58-59. The franchise granted to the CATV operator by
the city also limits the control which the operator has over the content of the programming.
Id. at 56-57.
181. The Commission, recognizing the complexity of the problem, is applying a first-come,
first-served nondiscriminatory standard for the present, with modifications to be made based
on future experience. FCC Chairman's Letter 33.
182. For a discussion of the problems that may be encountered in determining who will be
entitled to access on the dedicated channels, see Botein, Towards a New Diversity: Access to
CA TV, CORNELL L.Q. (197 1).
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indirect effect of reducing the revenue available for experimentation
and new services. 18 The alternative would have been to impose the
cost upon the user. The major objection to this would be that certain
groups would be denied access, and the FCC would have had to
regulate the rates for the service. However, under the present rules the
rates charged to lessees of commercial channels will presumably have
to be regulated, raising the question of the actual burden of regulating
rates on non-commercial channels. Because the cable operator will
also own the studio and may charge the non-commercial channel
users for the use of production facilities 84 and because, presumably,
this rate must be controlled, the additional burden of regulating non-
commercial channel rates is even less significant.185
Another problem arising from the dedication of channels to pre-
scribed uses is that of enforcing non-discriminatory treatment of po-
tential users of both the commercial and non-commercial channel
capacity. Resolution of the problem is apparently being left up to the
operator, and the potential for abuse is great. Presumably anyone
desiring to lease the capacity will be able to do so,"'6 but no means
exists under present rules of insuring equal treatment with respect to
183. See, for example, the analogous argument made in text following note 161 and at 167
supra with respect to the effect of placing the cost of program origination on subscribers.
184. FCC Chairman's Letter 29.
185. The problem of regulating CATV rates arises from the difficulty in establishing the
rate base, depreciation rates, and rate of return. Also, CATV has thus far been a business of
comparatively high risk and needs venture capital, raising an argument against public utility
type of regulation. THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL MONOPOLY 30-31.
186. The Commission recognized that any attempt to provide access to divergent groups
would be frustrated by allowing the cable operator to exercise control over the content of the
programming. Defining equal access only in terms of a nondiscriminatory right to purchase
space or, if members of specific non-commercial groups-non-profit, educational, or govern-
ment-to acquire free time, does not adequately deal with the problem. The time of day and
the day of the week are factors in determining if two users actually were accorded equal
treatment. Another, but less obvious factor is the channel assigned; the local viewers may
identify one channel as having consistently superior programming making time on another
channel less valuable. The FCC's present approach is essentially one of leaving the CATV
operator in control. See Botein, supra note 182. The only possible source of difficulty is that
while the CATV owner is prohibited from exercising any control, FUTURE OF CABLE TELEVISION
62, he is not necessarily relieved of criminal or civil liability for the programming. However,
this threat is reduced because the intent necessary for a criminal conviction would probably not
be imputed to the owner absent any control over the programming. See, e.g., Baird v. Arizona
State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957). The inability to impute the necessary intent to the cable operator for a criminal
conviction, in turn, makes it unlikely that he will be subject to civil liability. Presumably the
suspect programming will concern "a matter of public or general interest," meaning that before
the owner could be liable for such a statement he would have had to act with actual malice.
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the desired time and channel. 187 Another possible abuse is in the use
of the channel dedicated to governmental use. The potential advan-
tage to incumbents in an election is readily apparent.
The administrative machinery necessary to implement the imposi-
tion of technical standards and the requirement that CATV act as a
common carrier 88 also presents a potential problem. Any attempt by
the FCC to regulate technical standards will require it to monitor the
performance of a great many individual systems. Regulating access
to the channel capacity will impose an equally heavy burden. While
the imposition of national technical standards may be desirable, the
regulation of third persons seeking to present programming involves
a local problem, and stringent national guidelines will not necessarily
prove beneficial.8 9 As a cost of requiring common carrier operations,
the Commission will be involved in making regulations concerning
rates, defining and enforcing nondiscriminatory treatment of indi-
viduals seeking to lease channel capacity, controlling program content
and ascertaining the number of channels and type of service in each
community being served by cable television. 19 0
The Relationship of Federal and State Regulation of CA TV
The exact relationship between federal and state governments in
respect to cable television has been based on the doctrine of pre-
emption and the impermissibility of burdening interstate commerce.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); see New York Times Co. v, Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). Even should the speech be outside the "actual malice" rule, it is neverthe-
less unlikely that the owner would be liable for damages caused by such speech. Assuming the
regulations are a valid exercise of the FCC's authority, the regulation prohibiting CATV
censorship in order to promote "robust, wide-open debate" is a manifestation of a federal
policy. State law imposing tort liability on the cable owner who complied with the federal law
would frustrate a national policy. Therefore, to effectuate a uniform federal policy, the regula-
tion arguably pre-empts the area, making the state law invalid. Cf Farmers Educational &
Coop. Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
187. Indeed, it is arguable, because of CATV's connection with the federal regulatory
process, that action by the cable operator is state action, cf Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
384-85 (1967); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 281-83 (1963); Garner v. Louisiana, 268
U.S. 157, 182-84 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring opinions), and that any attempt, therefore, to
control programming presented by third persons would violate the first amendment. Compare
Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television
Time, 57 VA. L. REv. 574, 587 (1971) with Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, 57 VA. L.
REv. 636, 637 (1971).
188. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. -. (1972).
189. See notes 246-47, 249 infra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 185 & 187 supra.
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The relationship was characterized in T. V. Pix Inc. v. Taylor"' as one
where the state was free to regulate whatever the FCC chose not to
regulate so long as the state's regulation did not place a burden on
interstate commerce. A recognition that these two doctrines may not
be adequate to delineate the relationship prompted the FCC to pro-
pose that rules be adopted to further define the respective areas of
federal, state and dual regulation. 192
State and Local Regulations. During the initial phases of cable
television development, state and municipal governments were the
only governmental authorities seeking to regulate the growing indus-
try. Because the advent of CATV had not been anticipated by state
legislatures, it was unclear what statutes were applicable. Local and
state regulation has thus evolved from general principles governing
the authority of states and municipal corporations.
Where the CATV company contemplates constructing its own
transmission facilities in the city, it is required to obtain permission
from the state to use the public right-of-way in a manner not common
to the public generally.' Where general enabling legislation grants a
municipality the power to regulate the use of its streets through fran-
chises, 94 the city clearly has the power to grant or deny a cable
operator permission to use the streets for construction of the distribu-
tion system. 99 A problem arises, however, when the city's authority
is limited to issuing franchises to public utilities. Generally whejn used
in authorization statutes the term "public utility" is not defined
within that statute.' "The question . . . does not depend on legisla-
tive definition, but on the nature of the business or service ren-
191. 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), affdper curiam 396 U.S. 556 (1970).
192. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 F.C.C.2d 50 (1970).
193. 12 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 34.10 (3d ed. 1950). "The power to
grant franchises resides in the state; and a city, in granting a franchise, acts as agent for the
state." Id.
194. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
195. Illinois Broadcasting Co. v. Decatur, 96 Ill. App. 2d 454, 461, 238 N.E.2d 261, 264
(1968).
196. The term "public utility" is generally defined in the statute establishing the state
utilities commission. But it would not necessarily follow that this definition should be applicable
when the term is used in other authorization statutes. In fact, if "public utility" as used in
granting municipal franchising is confined to the definition giving exclusive jurisdiction to the
utilities commission, the delegation to the municipality is meaningless because whatever author-
ity the city would have under the statute would be pre-empted by the jurisdiction of the utilities
commission.
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dered. .... 11117 Since the distribution system for cable television con-
sists of coaxial cable, it is highly unlikely that more than two systems
will provide service to the same geographic area. Under these circum-
stances, a cable television operator would have a technical or natural
monopoly. 9 ' This aspect of CATV would indicate that it is the type
of service which would be considered a public utility.''
If the municipality has the authority to issue franchises, very com-
prehensive regulation of CATV is possible. A franchise is a contract
once it has been accepted by the applicant.21 11 It is thus possible for
the municipality to regulate aspects of the franchised business which
it could not reach under its general regulatory power. For example,
the city is able to charge as a franchise fee either a percentage of the
gross revenue or a set rate per year, without being restricted by its
taxing power. The provisions of the franchise, because of their con-
tractual nature, do not have to be within the legislative power of the
city.20'
If the city does not have the power to issue franchises to a cable
system, any regulation must be made on the basis of the city's police
power. In such instances, the regulation must be reasonably related
to the health, safety and welfare of the public. The regulations would
have to be general in nature, and fees levied would be limited by the
197. Aberdeen Cable TV Service, Inc. v. Aberdeen, -S.D. - - 176 N.W.2d 738,
741 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
198. THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL MONOPOLY I. See Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its
Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969) for a discussion of the characteristics of a natural
monopoly.
199. See Aberdeen Cable TV Service, Inc. v. Aberdeen, - S.D. - 176 N.W.2d 738
(1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971). Contra Hubbard Broadcasting Inc. v. Alberquerque,
18 P&F RADIO REG.2D (Dist. Ct. N.M.), rev'd on other grounds, - N.M. -, 20 P&F
RADIo REG.2D 2118 (1970).
200. E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 193, at § 34.06.
201. Illinois Broadcasting Co. v. Decatur, 96 Ill. App. 2d 454, 462, 238 N.E.2d 261, 265
(1968); H & B Communications Corp. v. Richland, 79 Wash. 2d 312, 484 P.2d 1141 (1971).
Contra Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970). The court in
Wonderland Ventures held that the franchise fee was an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. However, the city of Sandusky did not have the authority to grant franchises;
therefore the provision held invalid was a tax rather than a franchise, or contractual provision.
The decision can be criticized because the tax, while technically levied on a part of interstate
commerce, did not discriminate against interstate commerce, the business affected was local in
nature, and the commerce would not be subsequently taxed by another government. See western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). For a general discussion ofgross receipts
taxes on broadcasting see Note, Gross Receipts Taxation of Interstate Mass Media, 55 IOWA
L. REV. 1268 (1970).
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taxing power of the municipality, which, in most cases, would be a
license fee reasonably related to the cost of issuing the license. 202
Even where the municipality has the authority to grant franchises
to CATV on the basis of general franchising legislation, the authority
does not extend to cable systems which do not use the public streets
in construction of their distribution system. 213 If the cable operator,
rather than constructing his own transmission system, enters into a
lease-back agreement with a telephone company, 24 the city will not
be able to require the CATV owner to obtain a franchise from the
municipality. If, as is the case in most states, 205 the telephone company
is subject to the regulation of the state utilities commission, the mu-
nicipality's only authority to regulate the cable systems would be
under its police power. 20 1
In some states, the state utility commission itself has asserted
jurisdiction over cable television .20 Thus jurisdiction, normally based
on general enabling legislation, 28 is limited by the specific language
of the statute. In those states where the enabling statute gives the state
commission authority to regulate "facilities for the transmission of
intelligence by electricity," CATV comes under the commission's
authority. 20 19 Where the authority of the utility commission is limited
to "telephone companies and other common carriers," the courts
have in the past reasoned that because a CATV system provides only
202. In Greater Fremont, Inc. v. Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ohio 1968), affd sub
non. Wonderland Ventures Inc. v. Sandusky, 423 F. 2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970), because the city
did not have the power to issue a franchise, the court held the city could not regulate cable
television without regulating other media, establish rates, enforce a license fee which was not
reasonably related to the cost of granting the license, or levy a special tax upon cable television.
See note 201 supra.
203. New York v. Comtel, Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 585, 293 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1968), affd
without opinion, 30 App. Div. 2d 1049, 294 N.Y.S.2d 981 (App. Div.), affd without opinion,
25 N.Y.2d 922, 252 N.E.2d 285, 304 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1969).
204. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
205. See. e.g., CAL. PUB. UTILITY CODE § 1001 (West 1956); N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAW § 5
(MeKinney 1955).
206, Greater Fremont, Inc. v. Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ohio 1968), affd sub nom.
Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970).
207. See Independent Theatre Owners v. Public Service Commission, 235 Ark. 668, 361
S.W.2d 642 (1962).
208. At least three states, however, have enacted special legislation explicitly giving the state
public utilities commission jurisdiction over cable television. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 16-330 to 16-333 (Supp. 1967); Nav. REV. STAT. §§ 711.010 to 711.180 (1967); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANNOT. §§ 39-19-1 to 39-19-8 (Supp. 1970).
209. Independent Theatre Owners v. Public Service Commission, 235 Ark. 668, 361 S.W.2d
642 (1962).
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a means for one-way communications, whereas a telephone company
provides two-way service, the commission does not have jurisdiction
over cable television .21 Thus, for a cable system capable of providing
two-way communications, this distinction between CATV and tele-
phone companies would no longer be viable. Many more utility com-
missions will therefore acquire jurisdiction over CATV as cable oper-
ators comply with the FCC's requirement for two-way communica-
tion. 211
Where the utility commission has regulatory authority, the cable
operator must apply for a certificate of public necessity and con-
venience before commencing construction. In issuing the certificate,
the commission is empowered to set rates, standards of service, and
construction requirements. Thereafter, the cable system is subject to
the continuing supervision of the utilities commission.212
The state utility commission may have indirect jurisdiction over
cable television systems entering into lease-back arrangements with
common carriers. If the state commission has the authority to disap-
prove additional services, the utility commission can condition its
approval on the lease-back arrangement meeting minimum require-
ments. 21 3 The utility commission's authority in such instances will
enable it to set rates charged by the common carriers for the service
to CATV and possibly, by withholding approval unless the CATV
system meets specific standards, supervise the rates charged to sub-
scribers as well.214 In the case where the municipality has authority
to issue franchises to control the use of its streets, the utility commis-
210. 47 Cal. 2d 82, 301 P.2d 862 (1956); Minnesota Microwave, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission, - Minn. _ 190 N.W.2d 661 (1971); Ceracche Television Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, 49 Misc. 2d 554, 267 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1960); 1965 OP. Arr'Y GEN.
402-04 (Ind.).
211. The two-way communication requirement is discussed at notes 170, 177.
212. T.V. Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), affdper curiamt 396 U.S.
556 (1970).
213. The theory underlying the state utilities commission's indirect authority would be the
same as used by the FCC to regulate lease-back arrangements. See notes 37-48 supra and
accompanying text.
214. However, in most instances, the public utility commissions have rejected taking juris-
diction over cable television and telephone company lease-back arrangements on a theory that
the commission does not have authority to regulate the activities of a subscriber to the utility
unless the activity of that subscriber interferes with the use of the utility by another subscriber.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 P.U.R. 3d 462 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm. 1965); City of Jackson
v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 63 P.U.R.3d 384 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1966); Seneca Radio
Corp., 57 P.U.R.3d 67 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm. 1964).
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sion can authorize a telephone company to carry CATV even though
the city has franchised another system to construct its own transmis-
sion facilities. 215
The Efficacy of State Regulation. The basis of the argument made
in support of franchising or utility regulation of cable television is that
CATV is a natural monopoly. 216 In the absence of regulation, the
monopolistic firm will be able to charge a price in excess of that
justified by the cost of providing the service. Moreover, because the
distribution system is placed upon public property, local regulation
is necessary to prevent the misuse of a scarce public resource. 217 Fi-
nally, continuing regulation is necessary to insure that rates reflect the
current cost of operation to prevent either the industry or the custo-
mer from receiving a windfall through changes in technology.
Regulating cable television as a public utility, however, tends to
ignore significant aspects of the service. Under present conditions,
cable television is a high-risk venture, as distinguished from a business
normally classified as a public utility. 218 Also, while cable television
may not be competing with other CATV systems, it must compete
with broadcast television.1 9 Under present conditions, the penetration
of cable television is likely to be limited to approximately forty to fifty
percent of the viewers in a given area, 2 leaving broadcast television
as a viable alternative to subscribing to cable television. At this level
of penetration, CATV's subscription price must be set to attract new
subscribers and retain present customers. However, in the absence of
competition from another cable television, a cable operator can set
the subscription fee at a level which will include at least some degree
of monopoly profits. While the number of subscribers will be reduced,
gross income will be increased.2 21 Nevertheless, the lack of competi-
215. New York v. Comtel, Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 585, 293 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1968), affd
without opinion, 30 App. Div. 2d 1049, 294 N.Y.S.2d 981 (App. Div.), affd without opinion,
25 N.Y.2d 922, 252 N.E.2d 285, 304 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1969).
216. See note 198 supra and accompanying text.
217. THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL MONOPOLY 12-13.
218. W. JONES, REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION BY THE STATE OF NEW YORK 122-23,
183 (1970).
219. See notes 164-67 supra and accompanying text.
220. IMPACT OF CABLE GROWTH 8.
221. . . . [t]he means by which the monopolist seeks to maximize profits may create
inefficiency. Suppose that a widget costs 4 cents to produce (regardless of quantity) and
that the widget monopolist can sell 10,000 at 7 cents, 12,000 at 6 cents, 13,000 at 5 cents,
and 14,000 at 4 cents. Given this demand schedule, the profit-maximizing monopolist
will sell at 7 cents, where his total cost is $400, his total revenue $700, and his monopoly
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tion from other cable systems is more likely to result in a reluctance
to extend the service to less profitable areas than in the cost of the
service exceeding that expected under competitive circumstances.
While the state's regulation of CATV as a public utility may keep
down costs, it will not necessarily stimulate expansion of CATV ser-
vices.
Like state regulation, the franchising system employed in most
municipalities does not adequately cope with significant aspects of
cable television. Normally, the franchise is granted by the city at set
rates in return for payment of a concession fee by the successful
applicant. The franchise gives the cable operator limited legal protec-
tion from possible competition from another cable system,"' thus
making the municipality a partner in exploiting a monopoly. 22 The
subscription rate set in the franchise may represent an excess over cost
of the service, the concession fee, arid a reasonable profit, thereby
including monopoly profits. Even if the rate is not excessive, there is
no incentive to expand the system into areas where the cost per sub-
scriber reduces profits. Also, the procedure of setting the rates as well
as changing them may discourage technological improvements. Be-
cause of the regulatory lag in changing rates to reflect a new rate base
or services the cable operator will be discouraged from investing
funds. 224
profit $300. Posner, supra note 198, at 55 1.
This problem is further accentuated by the fact that the cost per subscriber of the
transmission system will differ in different parts of the community. The cost per
subscriber will depend upon the density of the population in an area and the percentage of
households likely to subscribe; therefore, it is possible that by selecting the area within the
city with the lowest cost per subscriber and setting a monopolistic price, the operator will
be able to maximize his income. This will, however, result in fewer people receiving
service at a higher price than under competition.
"222. The power to grant an exclusie franchise is not implicit in the power to grant a
franchise. E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 193, at § 34.23.
223. The concession fee paid to the city will be taken from the monopolistic profit realized
by the cable operator. THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL MONOPOLY 17. An alternative to the concession
fee approach would be to auction off the franchise to the highest bidder. This would capture
the monopoly profits for the public with a relatively low administrative cost. This does nothing
to alleviate the monopoly problem, but the subscription fees would not be higher than under
the concession fee approach-and the administrative cost would be much less. Also, it is more
likely that the entire monopolistic profit would be secured by the public because two competing
bidders would force the lump sum to be paid for the franchise to a figure reflecting the expected
monopolistic profit to be gained from the franchise. Id. at 14.
224. However, if technological advancement would reduce the cable operator's costs the
regulatory lag will increase his profits. Cf Comment, The Effluent Fee Approach for Control-
ling Air Pollution, 1970 DuKE L.J. 943, 954.
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Effective concession fee franchising will require an extensive ad-
ministrative structure. In order to insure that competition among
applicants will be effective to reduce the initial rates and provide
adequate service, the terms of the franchise must be very comprehen-
sive. The initial drafting together with the review of rates and contin-
ued regulation, will require expertise not possessed by most cities and
will put a heavy burden on already overworked state utilities commis-
sions. Moreover, this type of regulation fails to focus upon the prob-
lems of equal access to the transmission facilities and insuring that
the service is made available to as many viewers as possible, and is
likely to retard rather than stimulate the development of cable televi-
sion.
The Present Federal-State Relationship. The validity of state and
local regulations has been challenged on several grounds, one of which
is that state regulation is void because it constitutes an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce. That cable television is part of
interstate commerce was made clear in United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co.,12 where the Court characterized the cable company as a
point upon a stream of communication which is indivisible into inter-
state and intrastate components. However, to characterize CATV as
within the flow of interstate commerce does not necessarily imply that
all state regulation is prohibited. State regulation touching upon inter-
state commerce is not sufficient to invalidate the attempted regula-
tion.2 11 When a regulation based on a state's police power affects
interstate commerce, the regulation is valid if it does not discriminate
against interstate commerce and does not impinge upon an area which
requires uniform national regulation.2 27 By its nature, state regulation
of cable television does not discriminate against interstate commerce;
such regulation does not give preference to a local activity at the
expense of the interstate activity, nor does it single out cable television
because of its interstate character.
The stronger contention is that because of the nature of cable
television as a part of a nationwide communications stream, it re-
quires national uniformity of regulation. However, in T. V. Pix Inc.
v. Taylor'21 the court said that while there is one continuous interstate
transmission to the viewer's television set, "the apparatus of the com-
225. 392 U.S. 157, 169 (1968).
226. Head v. Board of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 429 (1963).
227. Id.
228. 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), affd per curiam 396 U.S. 556 (1970).
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munity antenna system is an appendage to the primary interstate
broadcasting facilities with incidents much more local than national,
involving cable equipment through the public streets and ways, local
franchises . . . and local intrastate collections. ' 22 The local CATV
system's impact on interstate commerce, said the court, "is analo-
gous to a local express or parcel delivery service or a local pilotage
or lighter service organized to facilitate the final interstate delivery of
goods to the named consignee."" Implicit in this description is the
concept that cable television, rather than requiring uniform regula-
tion, is particularly susceptible to dual regulation. The existence of
state regulation "is not a burden upon a television signal or any item
passing in interstate commerce. ' ' 31
The argument has also been advanced that FCC regulations have
pre-empted the area of CATV regulation from consideration by the
states. The proposition is premised on a pre-CATV decision which
held that the Communication Act, applying to all phases of broad-
casting, precluded state action. 2 This decision was modified in Head
v. Board of Examiners233 which upheld state regulations affecting
radio broadcasting. To determine whether or not an area of commerce
has been pre-empted requires a consideration of the effect which en-
forcement of local regulation has upon federal regulation and the
compatibility of the objectives sought to be achieved by the different
levels of regulation. The test is not whether the purposes of the two
regulations are parallel, but, rather, whether the two can exist to-
gether.2 Absent a clear mandate from Congress to displace state
regulation from an area of commerce, there seems to be no reason
why federal and state regulations cannot exist at the same time .23 In
T. V Pix Inc. v. Taylor,236 it was decided that as long as the FCC has
not, in fact, regulated the same area as the local regulation, the local
regulation is valid. Thus, the question is not resolved by ascertaining
whether the Commission has the authority to pre-empt an area;
229. Id. at 463.
230. Id.
231. Dispatch, Inc. v. Erie, 249 F. Supp. 267, 271 (W.D. Pa. 1965), vacated 364 F.2d 539
(3d Cir. 1966), dismissed on rehearing sub norm. Lamb Enterprises v. Eric, 286 F. Supp. 865
(W.D. Pa. 1967), affdper curiam, 396 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1968).
232. Allen B. Dumont Lab. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950).
233. 374 U.S. 424, 431 (1963).
234. Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
235. Id. at 142.
236. 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), affdper curian, 396 U.S. 556 (1970).
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rather, it must be determined whether the FCC has, in fact, pre-
empted the field.237
The FCC Regulations. The FCC has determined that the federal
government should exclusively regulate as to signals carried, mini-
mum channel capacity and other technical standards, program origin-
ation, and cross-ownership of cable and other media.28s In addition
the Commission has determined that it should pre-empt local regula-
tion pertaining to common carrier services provided by a CATV
system. Finally, the Commission contemplates dual regulation of
minimum local service standards by requiring that a cable owner file
a copy of his franchise with the FCC before permission is granted to
carry broadcast signals.? Unless the local government has made
provision within the franchise that service will be provided equally to
all sectors of the franchise area 40 and included a requirement that the
system be operable within one year and that service will be available
to the entire franchise area within five years, 41 permission to carry
broadcast signals will be refused. Moreover, the local government will
be required to limit the duration of the franchise to a reasonable time,
generally not exceeding 15 years,242 and subscriber rates must be ini-
tially approved by the local government, with an established proce-
dure to review rate changes and to review service complaints. In addi-
tion, the FCC will refuse permission if the franchise fee exacted by
the local government is unreasonable-that is, if it produces revenue
in excess of that necessary to cover the cost of regulating the CATV
system.243 In order to monitor the effects of its regulations on state
and local efforts the Commission is proposing to establish a national
committee composed of state, local and federal officials, and CATV
and public interest representatives to review cable television regula-
tions.
Thus, the selection of the franchise holder, regulation of rates,
review of the progress of construction, and handling of service com-
plaints will continue to be areas of state and local regulation through
municipal franchising or utility commission jurisdiction. The FCC
237. Id. at 465.
238. FCC Chairman's Letter 44.
239. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(a) (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. FCC Chairman's Letter 48.
243. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(c) (1972), 37 Fed. Reg. - (1972).
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claims to retain authority to regulate distant signal importation, ca-
blecasting and common carrier services. In theory, at least, the regula-
tions contemplate dual regulation with respect to the setting of mini-
mum local service standards. The only remaining question is whether
this allocation of regulatory authority is the most desirable.
As for the regulations limiting the importation of distant signals,
if this area is to be regulated at all, 24 it is clearly a federal function.
The importation rules are not designed merely to protect local broad-
casters from competition, but to protect the total service available to
the public. 24
5
National regulation over cablecasting, however, would either im-
pose an intolerable administrative cost or lack the flexibility necessary
to benefit local needs. In neither case would the possible benefit
justify the cost. 246 If cablecasting is to provide an outlet for local
expression, the programming must be locally oriented. However, the
amount of locally-oriented programming which is actually feasible
will depend on local circumstances. In this situation, local regulation
should be considered. 247
The regulation of CATV's common carrier operation should be
allocated between federal and local governments rather than totally
controlled at the federal level. Insuring that CATV systems meet
minimum channel and technical standards is a federal problem. The
problem of access, however, cannot adequately be handled at the
national level since national enforcement would lack flexibility. Even
more serious would be the expense involved in obtaining a hearing of
alleged discrimination. If federal regulations governed access, one's
complaint would have to be filed with the FCC. In this situation, very
few individuals would be in a financial position to utilize the hearing
procedure, thus effectively defeating the objective of expanding the
number of individuals having access to the media.
Finally, whatever the theory behind it, the setting of minimum
local service standards in practice makes the local entity an adminis-
trative agent of the FCC, by requiring the local government to enforce
FCC standards. The FCC's ability to force the local government to
enter into that agency relationship with the FCC is very limited, and
244. For an argument that the present regulations have little positive effect, see notes 146-
47 supra and accompanying text.
245. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
246. See notes 165-67 supra and accompanying text.
247. FUTURE OF CABLE TELEVISION 48.
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major reliance will have to be placed on the desire of local govern-
ments to have CATV, as the inducement to enact minimum stan-
dards. While cable television offers a source of revenue to local
governments, thus making enactment of minimum standards more
attractive, limiting the franchise fee would, in turn, negate the induce-
ment. 2 8 Treating cable television as an independent source of revenue,
on the other hand, may frustrate rather than implement national
communications policy.
In short, conceiving the role of the federal government as encom-
passing the entire area of cable television will create a heavy adminis-
trative burden. Attempting to define the federal-local relationship in
such a way that the local government becomes an administrative
agent of the federal government, as is the case with the present rules,
does not adequately cope with the problem. If the decision-making is
to be at the federal level, regardless of state or local participation, the
result will ultimately be complete pre-emption of the authority to
regulate.
An alternate approach would be a recognition that many of the
decisions must be made at the local level. The major strengths at the
federal level are the expertise and the ability to gather information.
The role of the federal government should be to provide uniform
regulation of those aspects which actually will benefit from national
regulation. However, in relation to local governments, the federal role
should be one of encouraging experimentation with different ap-
proaches. The proposed committee composed of state, local, and fed-
eral officials to evaluate CATV regulation is a move in this direction.
The federal goal should be to provide sufficient information and ex-
pertise to foster local regulatory structures, which will, in turn,
achieve national policies.2 9
248. BROADCASTING, Nov. 2, 1970, at 40. The authority to set these conditions is also
questionable. If the FCC has not pre-empted the area, the local government retains the right to
regulate cable television. See notes 84-89 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the use
of conditions. I f the Commission has in fact pre-empted the area, the cable operators' opportun-
ity to engage in a business should not depend on the local government's willingness to assume
the FCC's administrative burden.
249. The approach will have to be a more informal relationship between the FCC and state
governments. Rather than attempting to use regulation as a means of forcing the state to further
national policy, the federal government will have to use its superior expertise to encourage the
establishment of a local regulatory framework that will be compatible with the national interest.
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FUTURE PROSPECTS: CATV AS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
ACCESS TO THE MEDIA
Governmental regulation of broadcasting is premised upon the
assumption that such regulation is necessary to insure that those using
the limited broadcast spectrum do so in a manner consistent with the
national interest.2 0 Traditionally, the opportunity to broadcast pro-
gramming has been limited to a very few people. As a consequence,
it has been deemed highly desirable that those having control over an
important means of communication be regulated in the use of a scarce
public resource. The FCC's regulation of broadcasting has thus been
thought to be a means of protecting the first amendment guarantees
of free speech rather than an abridgement of individual rights."5 '
Cable television is emerging as an entity which cannot be regulated
under this rationale. A CATV system provides, as does broadcast
television, the means of transmitting programming to viewers. How-
ever, as distinguished from broadcasting, a cable television operator
does not and need not provide the programming which is transmit-
ted.2 2 Since cable television performs several functionally separable
250. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
251. Id. In addition to the scarcity theory, other rationales have been advanced to justify
government reguation of broadcasting. The public domain theory is premised on the argument
that the public owns the spectrum space and therefore has the right to regulate its use. See
RTNDA v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1019 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nora. Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). This theory would be an appropriate rationale
for regulating cable ownership because the cable is normally placed on public property; however,
this does not justify the regulation of those who use the cable. Analogous to the public domain
rationale is the privilege theory that the government can attach conditions to the granting of a
special privilege. See Television Corp. of Michigan v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730, 733-34 (D.C. Cir.
1961). However the concept of special privilege is based on the scarcity of available frequencies.
The impact theory is premised on the argument that the media must be controlled because of
their potential impact on the community. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 307-08 (1951)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). However, because of the greatly increased channel capacity of cable
television, many more people will have the opportunity to present ideas, and the absence of a
very few channels having a captive audience makes the impact rationale inapplicable to CATV.
The imposition theory has been used to justify regulations designed to protect the viewer from
offensive communication. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 842 (1969). However this rationale is only applicable to short messages inserted among
material the viewer may want to watch.
All of these rationales are essentially premised on the aspect of scarcity of spectrum space
and greatly weakened by the increased channel capacity of cable television. For a full develop-
ment and criticisms of the rationales to justify regulation of broadcasting, see Note, Cable
Television and the First Anendment, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1008 (1971).
252. While it is conceivable that separate control of the transmission facilities and of the
programming would be possible with broadcasting, it would not result in a significant reduction
of potential control by one individual. Because of limited spectrum space, regulation over the
programming would still be necessary.
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services, the entire justification for regulation needs to be reexam-
ined. . Regulation of the owner of the distribution system would still
be necessary to further the public interest, because it is not economi-
cally feasible to have more than one distribution system in one geo-
graphic area. Even if it were economically feasible, it is inconvenient
and inefficient to the public to have many cables placed over or under
public streets. However, it does not necessarily follow that regulation
of the programming carried over that cable system is warranted.
Heretofore, because only limited programming could be transmitted,
it was deemed necessary to regulate programming. Cable television
provides a means of transmitting a very large volume of program-
ming. With this development, attempts to regulate the programming
would conceivably constitute an abridgment of freedom of speech.
The focal point of regulating cable television should be the transmis-
sion system. Issues presented by cable television which have not been
present with broadcasting include access to the transmission facilities
and insuring that the service is made available to the greatest possible
number of people.
The simplest approach in determining who will be able to use the
cable to transmit programming is for the owner to lease the service
for whatever price the market will bear; however, there are serious
policy objections to this approach. Under present conditions, it is
doubtful if either a large enough demand for or a large enough supply
of programming exists to maximize the transmission capabilities of
a large cable system 54 The cable operator would have a monopoly
over the transmission facilities and, as such, would be able to charge
a monopolistic price for the service.255 The monopolistic price, in turn,
by reducing the number able to afford to lease a channel, would result
in a smaller amount of programming being carried by the cable. 25
253. The FCC is presently re-evaluating the fairness doctrine. However this re-evaluation
appears to stop short of questioning the underlying theory of regulating broadcasting after the
advent of CATV. See BROADCASTING, June 14, 1971, at 22.
254. While the Canadian experience, especially in Montreal, indicates that there is a large
group of individuals who will seek to present programming, it does not appear that this demand
would completely use forty-two or more channels. THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL ORIGINATION 9.
However, this could be completely changed by using cable to transmit more than television
programming. See note 3 supra.
255. See notes 221-23 supra and accompanying text. The objections to treating cable televi-
sion as a monopoly would not be present here because there is no viable alternative for the
individual to present programming.
256. See note 221 supra. The reduction would not be as dramatic as in the cited example
because the cost of providing an additional unit of service would be less than the preceding unit.
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Even assuming that the demand for the transmitting facilities exceeds
the supply and the operator can maximize his profits by leasing his
entire transmission capability, it is by no means certain that the type
of programming presented would be the most desirable. To the extent
that the programming is considered entertainment and the supplier is
interested in making a profit, the programming would be of the type
and quality demanded by the viewer.2 7 Moreover, to the extent that
the content of the programming is ideological, to allow only those
able to pay a high price or those with whom the cable operator agrees
to present their message does not encourage a free exchange of ideas.
Present governmental regulation does not adequately meet or even
envision meeting this problem. As cable television increasingly
provides programming not otherwise available, the problem will have
to be faced. Despite the limitations of existing local regulation,"'
possibly the only way in which these problems can be solved is
through local regulation.219 The FCC, because of its expertise and
information gathering capabilities, is in a position to establish techni-
cal standards and a minimum level of services to be provided by cable
television, but the actual rates to be charged subscribers as well as
individuals wishing to provide programming should be handled at the
local level. Also, the expertise of the federal government should be
available to the local government to establish requirements necessary
for that locality. Rather than relying on the present concession fee
approach, 60 the local government unit should allow the applicants to
bargain over the rates to be charged for the required service with the
concession going to the applicant proposing the lowest rate rather
than the applicant willing to pay the city the highest fee, as under the
concession fee approach. 6' Such an approach would relieve the local
But the total units provided under monopolistic conditions will still be less than under perfect
competition. However, if the monopolist charged a different price for each unit of service there
would not necessarily be a decrease in the total number of units provided.
257. This does not necessarily mean that the programming would be identical to that
presently offered. Because of the increased amount of programming, it is a reasonable proposi-
tion that rather than aiming at the mass audience, a significant amount of the programming
will be aimed at particular audiences. This is even more reasonable if the individual supplying
the program is not concerned with keeping a large audience constantly viewing the same channel.
258. For a criticism of local regulation see Botein, supra note 57, at 817-21; Regulation of
Community Antenna Television, supra note 3, at 850-53.
259. One obvious disadvantage of allocating authority to many local governmental units is
the increased possibility of corruption. BROADCASTING, Oct. 25, 1971, at 26.
260. See notes 222-24 supra and accompanying text,
261. THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL MONOPOLY 16. This would be similar to the present practice
of awarding contracts for the construction of highways.
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government of the burden of setting and reviewing rate structures
while still insuring that the rates were reasonable. 62 Both federal and
local governments would be free to insure that the standards were
being met.
The most important service which needs to be provided by govern-
mental action is insuring that individuals who seek and are denied the
privilege of presenting programming over the cable have an inexpen-
sive and expeditious recourse to the courts.283 As it becomes possible
to increase the amount of programming which can be presented, the
state's regulation of programming loses its justification. But neither
should the private owner of CATV be permitted to control the content
of programming. Government is under an obligation to insure both
that the individual can gain access to the transmitting facilities and
that he can secure inexpensive judicial review if for some reason he is
unable to present his message. If the promise of cable television is to
provide diversity of programming, the unpopular, the unorthodox, as
well as the accepted, should be available.
262. The natural monopoly theory would not be applicable at the applicant stage assuming
there was actual competition for the privilege to construct the system.
263. Cf Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (see especially Harlan, J.,
concurring); Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S.
395 (1953).
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